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Introduction 
 
My dissertation contains three independent chapters in the area of 
labour economics. All the chapters deal with labour market flexibility, 
security and complexity. Two of the chapters relate specifically to perceived 
security, flexibility and job satisfaction while the last investigates labour 
market programs and their impact on a regional labour market. 
Switzerland is characterized by a relatively strong market 
performance with high rates of employment; federal laws regulate the policy 
of the labour market but the Canton is the level of implementation of 
concrete initiatives. Studying the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness to 
be applied to labour market policies cannot therefore fail to know in detail 
the regional labour market, the skills level and the degree of dynamism and 
security of labour markets.  
 Consequently, the geographical position in the European context, the 
federalist structure, the high share of immigrant workers are interesting 
factors. Moreover, the small scale of the country and the presence of 
different regional labour markets should imply spatial concentration and 
differentiation of the economic structure among regions. Finally, 
Switzerland provides a particularly appropriate market to examine the 
potential effects of “flexibility and security” type arrangements due to the 
relatively high incidence of part-time contracts and flexible employment 
contracts: in 2010, 21.9% of the 182,000 temporary employees had a contract 
that would have expired within six months. Another 53.5%, however, had an 
employment relationship in duration from six months to two years.  
For this reason, I devoted particular attention to job satisfaction and 
job insecurity as economic variables, since growing literature shows that, in 
order to determine what dynamics impact on general workers’ well-being, 
the relationships between these variables is a crucial factor (Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2007).  
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Indeed, over the last couple of decades, because of the intensification 
of competitiveness due to market globalization together with the spread of 
new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), policy makers 
have been trying to enhance the flexibility and improve the performance of 
European labour markets through the application of extensive labour 
market reforms. An aspect of these reforms has been the simplification of 
the restrictions regulating the use of temporary employment contracts 
(OECD, 2006) and the wide spreading of so-called flexible contracts such as 
fixed-term contract and temporary agency work. After a first period of 
increasing feeling of insecurity, during the ’90 it decreased, although with 
important differences between countries (Auer and Cazes, 2003). 
The balance between labour market flexibility and security is 
therefore a lively policy issue: investigating the perception of job insecurity 
is important for several reasons. The presence of an economic literature in 
this field is recent, and there are many significant empirical questions to 
address. 
Economic restructuring constitutes indeed a long-term phenomenon 
(Fallick, 1996; Hipple, 1997), driven by a global marketization, a greater 
service industry growth relative to growth in other sectors and a rising 
premium for specialized skills related to technology shifts. Long-term work 
contracts are perceived to be costly, so their numbers are reduced and all 
the factors outlined above foster employers’ perceptions of the need for 
market efficiency, which rationalises a reduction of the workforce.  
Consequently, full-time and long-term employees express insecurity 
related to retaining current jobs and acquiring new ones; moreover, 
although mature workers may not “feel” the market forces that may be 
behind labour market changes, they perceive the relative insecurity of their 
own current employment. Are these concerns about job security related to 
the restructuring of their own occupations and industries? According to 
literature workers in industrial sectors with high displacement rates and in 
occupational sectors with high contingent employment rates are more likely 
to perceive job insecurity (Elman and O’Rand, 2002). 
Regional labour market analysis and policy evaluation: job insecurity, flexibility and complexity 
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In effect, studies conducted at the European level found that the 
performance of the worker is deeply influenced by the perception of job 
insecurity that alters physical and psychological well-being (Chirumbolo and 
Hellgren, 2003) and the workers’ job satisfaction and general employment 
loyalty (Sverke and Goslinga, 2003). 
The perception of job insecurity may also demotivate workers to 
invest their time and financial resources in education and training, as 
opposed to acquisition of additional firm-specific human capital (Elman and 
O’Rand, 2002). In addition, studies suggest that the perception of job 
insecurity can directly affect consumption and employment, and may 
undermine the workers’ bargaining power in negotiations with their 
employers (Manski and Straub, 2000). 
For this reason, the purpose of this thesis is, at first, to shed light on 
the perceptions of job insecurity among Swiss workers and evaluate whether 
these perceptions are consistent with actual economic outcomes. 
Moreover, in principle, temporary employment can have both positive 
and negative welfare consequences for workers. A flexible scheduling 
arrangement and other aspects of the daily work experience related to 
temporary work, indeed, may be valued and preferred by some employees, 
whereas the insecurity and poorer working conditions associated with these 
contract types can have a negative impact on workers’ welfare (Blanchard 
and Landier, 2002). Employment stability is instead desirable both for 
workers, who rank it as one of the most important factors for job satisfaction 
(European Commission, 2001), and for firms, which dislike high turnover 
and prefer stable employment relationships in order to retain human capital 
investment and reduce both workforce screening and selection costs. On the 
other hand, the recent intensification of competitive pressures has called for 
more flexibility in labour markets for both firms and workers. 
Since the ’70, psychologists and sociologists have been extensively 
analysing “job satisfaction” and, starting from Freeman (1978), this variable 
has been also recognized as an important economic variable in order to 
describe the economic life and the personal behaviour in the labour market. 
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 According to recent economic literature, job satisfaction is important 
for at least two reasons: it increases the productivity of labour and therefore 
the productivity of firms and it can improve overall social well-being, being 
closely related to individual happiness and well-being (Bruno, Caroleo and 
Dessy, 2013). 
A growing number of studies have investigated the determinants and 
consequences of differences in individuals’ reported job satisfaction. 
Research in psychology and sociology has emphasized that job satisfaction 
depends not only on the remuneration for the job but also on other 
workplace characteristics like career prospects, job security, job content, 
autonomy at work, and interpersonal relationships. Most of the studies in 
this strand of research show that job security and job content are the most 
influential determinants when it comes to explaining job satisfaction 
(D’Addio et al., 2007; De Cuyper et al., 2009). 
The main important issue, regarding this area of interest, is therefore 
to determine what factors influence the perception of security in the 
workplace and its impact on the welfare of workers. 
In summary, the economic literature identifies two different 
relationships between job security and flexibility: 
 
- the “trade-off” theory, which implies a negative relationship 
between flexibility and security. According to this hypothesis a high level of 
job security can only be achieved at the cost of poor flexibility and flexible 
employment patterns are in conflict with job security; 
 
- the “flexicurity” approach, which instead assumes that 
flexibility and security are not contradictions, but they can be mutually 
supportive, with the implementation of the right labour market policy. 
 
Using micro data, this work aims therefore to empirically assess the 
effect of a “flexicurity arrangement”, measured at a micro-level scale, on 
Regional labour market analysis and policy evaluation: job insecurity, flexibility and complexity 
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workers’ job satisfaction over the course of the business cycle period (2008-
2011). 
 
A second relevant issue that has been neglected by labour economics 
is the role of growing complexity in the labour market.  
In the last decades, determining the effects of labour institutions on 
macroeconomic performance has been a central concern of economic 
policymakers. The process through which firms and workers meet in the 
labour market and how this matching process affects (un)employment 
dynamics and wage setting, and the magnitude of this interaction over the 
business cycle (Merz, 1995) has been a central issue in labour economics. 
Diamond, (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), for example, defined 
a theory based on the “representative individual hypothesis”, which 
postulates hyper-rational firms and workers or implies static equilibrium 
conditions. This instrument, called matching function (MF), allowed labour 
economists to model employment out-flows and in-flows in the presence of 
frictional labour markets. Unfortunately, as discussed by Acemoglu and 
Shimer (2000) and Blau and Kahn (2000) it is difficult to obtain conclusive 
empirical results regarding how labour institutions react to economic 
performance. For example, the endogeneity makes it difficult to interpret 
the validity of empirical investigations because governments continually 
revise labour institutions in response to economic and political pressures, 
and it is consequently difficult to apply regression methods connecting 
changes in labour institutions to economic outcomes.  
There is another reason for which the study of the matching process 
should incorporate agent’s behaviour in its specification. Education and 
labour policy literature (Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005; Goldberg and 
Smith, 2007; Edgerton et al., 2012) assumes workers in unstable market 
sectors more likely to retrain, but workers’ labour market locations may 
provide differing incentives or disincentives for education and retraining. 
The objective to pursue human capital accumulation through further 
education is reduced in labour markets with limited workplace 
Introduction 
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opportunities. This generates educational reactions that push higher 
numbers of workers into postsecondary education and stimulate educational 
institutions. According to this literature, workers who perceive job 
insecurity are more likely to pursue educational activities. 
For this reason the issue of micro-foundation of MF has been 
intensively studied, and a growing number of studies highlights that the 
assumed MF should be consistent with labour market behaviour of firms 
and workers and that the MF could be endogenous (due to agents’ behaviour 
that can be affected by labour market policies and institutions), implying 
instability and vulnerability (Neugart, 2009). 
Recently, Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) has been 
proposed as a radically different interpretative strategy (Tesfatsion, 1998) 
in order to support labour policy makers in their decisions: a similar 
argument holds for many policy questions, which are typically related to at 
least some aspects of economy, technology, and actor behaviour (Chappin, 
Chmieliauskas and de Vries, 2012). With agents in a computer, it becomes 
possible to recreate actual world on an artificial basis, to see the effects of 
the action and interaction.  
In social science, indeed, models are generally built in two ways, as a 
verbal argumentation or as mathematical equations, typically with 
statistics and econometrics. The first way is absolutely flexible and 
adaptable, but mere descriptions and discussion, by their nature, preclude 
tests and verifications of hypotheses. In contrast, the second way allows for 
computations and verifications, but suffers from severe limitations in 
flexibility and adaptation, especially with respect to how agents are 
expected to operate in the model and when accounting for their 
heterogeneity and interactions (Terna, 2013). 
Computer simulation, which can be considered as a “third way”, can 
combine the extreme flexibility of a computer code where it is possible to 
create agents who act, make choices, and react to the choices of other agents 
and to modification of their environment and its intrinsic computability. 
This approach allows researchers to use the descriptive capabilities of 
Regional labour market analysis and policy evaluation: job insecurity, flexibility and complexity 
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verbal argumentation and the ability to calculate the effects of different 
situations and hypotheses together. 
However, the application of agent-based models (ABMs) for policy 
evaluation is still limited because ABMs might confront policy makers with 
the fact that for many of their objectives, they have limited control options. 
On the other hand, if ABMs are built with sufficient richness and 
organization to be applicable to real policy questions, simulation can act as a 
sort of “magnifying glass” that may be used to understand reality in a better 
way.  
Moreover, these new approaches are challenging, because new 
modelling techniques such as ABM are not established in the way that 
traditional ones are (Lejour et al., 2006). It is not possible, indeed, to assess 
the macroeconomic consequences of labour market policies using a pure 
micro-approach; in the same way a macro-approach does not permit to look 
at an individual level, making impossible to evaluate the impact of Labour 
Market Policies on a precise target group. Agent-based labour market 
models allow the extraction of information based on aggregate outcomes 
that are fully explained by the characteristics of the agents and the systemic 
structure of their actions. 
Since these type of models simulate complete sets of individual 
observations they have also an interest in addition to the micro-econometric 
evaluation approach ex post. A final advantage is that the simulation at the 
individual level can help to formulate hypotheses on the micro-economic 
agent’s behaviour using simple and intuitive rules, closer to the reality that 
the abstraction of rational aggregate models. This greater attention to the 
micro-economic reality behaviour characterizes the current ACE research 
(Testfasion, 2006). 
Finally, is then of interest to link micro-level and macro-level 
evaluations with an integrated (micro/macro) simulation model, trying to 
further diversify the battery of instruments used for Labour Market Policies 
evaluation. 
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The issues outlined above are developed in three essays. The first 
investigates the perceptions of job insecurity among Swiss workers over the 
course of the business cycle and evaluate whether these perceptions are 
consistent with actual economic outcomes. Following the literature, I employ 
two measures to assess worker perceptions of job insecurity: one reveals 
workers’ concerns about job loss, and the second evaluates their degree of 
satisfaction with their job security by means of a verbal scale. Using data 
from the longitudinal Swiss Household Panel (SHP) I therefore categorize 
workers according to their socio-demographic characteristics, job 
characteristics and Canton of residence and my descriptive analysis focuses 
on workers who perceived their job situation as insecure during this period. 
Using ordered probit analysis, I finally study how job insecurity varies by 
worker characteristics, over time and by current socio-economic conditions 
(unemployment rate and percentage of foreign population).  
The second essay assesses the effect of a micro-level measure of 
flexicurity on workers’ job satisfaction using individual-level data from the 
longitudinal Swiss Household Panel (SHP), related to temporary and 
permanent employees in Switzerland for the period 2005 to 2010. The 
sample of workers is disaggregated into different groups according to their 
employment contract (permanent or temporary) and their perceived job 
security; I analyse whether workers who are heterogeneous in terms of both 
the type of labour contract and their perceived security do also differ with 
regard to life satisfaction and specific aspects of the job satisfaction. Using 
Probit OLS or POLS, that consists in transforming an ordinal dependent 
variable in a “pseudo” continuous one, and allows the application of a linear 
model, I estimate a linear fixed effects model, thus controlling for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics. I also extend my analysis and 
seek to identify how insecurity affects temporary workers compared to 
permanent workers examining the impact of regional labour market 
conditions.  
The third essay, that follows (ACE) models approach, seeks to identify 
traceable connections between micro and macroeconomic scales exploring 
Regional labour market analysis and policy evaluation: job insecurity, flexibility and complexity 
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the regional labour market. It defines a virtual regional labour market with 
firms and worker agents. During the simulation periods firms, that are 
assigned different sectors and have sector-specific skill requirements, open 
vacant positions and receives applications; then randomly choose one 
applicant which fit with the firm’s skills requirement. Firms are also hit by 
shocks and dismiss their employees that are “too costly”. Moreover, 
unemployed workers have to invest in their human capital to qualify for 
vacancies opened in different sectors. Following the exposed perspective, I 
have developed a case study to test and validate the application of the 
proposed model and framework, exploring the regional labour market in the 
southern Switzerland (Ticino and some districts of the Grisons). At this 
point, the model is still experimental and calibration is very preliminary but 
it already allows to approximate a quite a number of stylized features of the 
southern Swiss regional labour market. 
 
In what follows, it is therefore at first presented the analysis of the 
perceptions of job insecurity among Swiss workers, then the investigation of 
the determinants of a perceived job satisfaction measure of flexicurity on 
workers’ job satisfaction, and finally the contribution that illustrate a 
regional labour market model with sector specific requirements and a 
procedure to evaluate Active Labour Market Policies. 
A conclusion paragraph draws results and conclusions of the 
dissertation. 
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Abstract 
 
Even though, from 2008 to 2011, the Swiss economy was for the most 
part in a state of positive growth, from mid-2008 up to the first quarter of 
2009, three consecutive quarters of declining gross domestic product (GDP) 
were registered (concomitant with the crisis in the financial markets), which 
had a negative structural effect on the labour market. Moreover, in the 
same period, the number of economically active foreign nationals grew by 
18.5%, while the number of economically active Swiss nationals grew only 
by 5.7%. 
 Our objective is thereby to study perceptions of job insecurity among 
Swiss workers over the course of this period and evaluate whether these 
perceptions are consistent with actual economic outcomes. 
Following the literature, we employ two measures to assess worker 
perceptions of job insecurity: one reveals workers’ concerns about job loss, 
and the second evaluates their degree of satisfaction with their job security 
by means of a verbal scale. Using data from the longitudinal Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP) we therefore examine perceptions of job insecurity 
among Swiss workers in 2008 and 2011. We categorize workers according to 
their socio-demographic characteristics, job characteristics and Canton of 
residence and our descriptive analysis focuses on workers who perceived 
their job situation as insecure during this period. Using ordered probit 
analysis, we finally study how job insecurity varies by worker 
characteristics, over time and by current socio-economic conditions 
(unemployment rate and percentage of foreign population). 
We find that, in analogy to previous studies, perceptions of job 
security are higher among workers with supervisory responsibilities and 
among workers who live in Cantons with favourable economic conditions 
(not only a low level of unemployment), confirming that the worker 
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perceptions depends on concrete labour market conditions and also on a 
complex set of subjective perceptions. 
 
JEL codes: J28, J71 
 
Keywords:  perceptions; job insecurity 
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of employment insecurity refers to all forms of welfare-
reducing uncertainty surrounding employment, encompassing uncertainty 
over the continuity of the current job (job insecurity), uncertainty over the 
work itself, and uncertainty over future labour market prospects 
(employment insecurity) (Dickerson and Green, 2012). This broad definition 
is often simplified in analysis to focus on two components of the mean 
expected loss arising from the uncertainty: the probability of job loss and its 
cost (including non-pecuniary losses). 
The balance between labour market flexibility and security is a  lively 
policy issue: investigating the perception of job insecurity is therefore 
important for several reasons. 
Studies conducted at the European level found that the performance 
of the worker is deeply influenced by the perception of job insecurity that 
alters physical and psychological well-being (Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 
2003; Wichert, 2002) and, moreover, the workers’ job satisfaction and 
general employment loyalty (Sverke and Goslinga, 2003). 
The perception of job insecurity may also demotivate workers to 
invest their time and financial resources in education and training, as 
opposed to acquisition of additional firm-specific human capital (Elman and 
O’Rand, 2002). In addition, the perception of job insecurity can directly 
affect consumption and employment, and may undermine the workers’ 
bargaining power in negotiations with their employers (Manski and Straub, 
2000). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Over the past three decades, the Swiss labour force has grown from 
about 3 million to 4.5 million people. In most respects, the Swiss labour 
market has performed above OECD average (Berclaz and Füglister, 2003), 
in particular when it comes to high employment rates, exceptionally low 
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unemployment and high wage levels going together with high labour 
productivity. First of all Switzerland has a liberal and flexible labour 
market, very similar to the ones found in English-speaking countries (US, 
UK) insofar as regulatory frameworks are concerned. However, it differs 
markedly with regard to vocational training and unemployment 
compensation. The high degree of flexibility and the low tax wedges for low 
skilled employment is another characteristic of the Swiss labour market. 
Secondly, the compromise between export-orientated and domestic 
producers has contributed to the creation of a segregated labour market: one 
is orientated towards exportation and is highly competitive. The financial 
sector, insurances and the pharmaceutical industry are part of this in 
international comparison. On the other side, there is a well-protected 
interior market composed by the agricultural and construction sectors: this 
way of protecting parts of the labour market may be considered as a kind of 
social policy, which guarantees the maintenance of jobs in those sectors. 
Thirdly, the unionization rate is very low. Switzerland has a tradition 
of cooperation and negotiation between social partners, the so-called “labour 
peace”, concluded in 1937 between firms’s organization and trade union. 
According to this principle, strikes and lockouts are prohibited during the 
period when collective convention are in force. 
The Swiss labour market is therefore characterised by high 
employment rates, low unemployment and high wage levels. The main 
factors underlying this good performance are normally considered to be a 
high degree of labour market flexibility, with decentralised wage bargaining 
and relatively low employment protection regulations, supported by a strong 
focus (at least since the mid-1990s) on active labour market policies and 
employment services characterised by strong “mutual-obligation” principles. 
Another feature of labour market performance has been the design of 
immigration policies, which in the past implied the use of immigrant labour 
as a labour supply reserve that left the country in times of economic 
hardship (Gerfin and Leu, 2007). 
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However, Switzerland has not escaped the global economic downturn 
starting in 2008. GDP growth became negative in the second half of the 
year, and stayed negative in 2009; economic growth then resumed strongly 
in 2010. The impact of the recession on the labour market, at first relatively 
modest, nevertheless led to a 30% rise in unemployment, from 3.5% in 2008 
to 4.4% in 2009, and only recently it has been starting going down (4.1% in 
2013 - last quarter). 
According to the fifth European survey into working conditions 
(2010), if on one hand, fear of losing one’s job is significantly lower in 
Switzerland compared with EU countries, on the other hand, working hours 
and deadline pressure in Switzerland are higher than average and there are 
more complaints of bullying at the workplace. Between 2005 and 2010, an 
increase was observed in two stress factors, namely long working hours and 
working under deadline pressure, and nowhere in the EU did these factors 
have such an effect as in Switzerland. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, the paper 
adds empirical evidence on job security providing indirect evidence of 
differences at a Swiss national level. Secondly, considering two different 
aspects of job insecurity over a period of time allows us to track changes in 
the perception of workers, addressing the question of whether the 
perception of job insecurity among Swiss workers are consistent with actual 
results and the current situation of the labour market in Switzerland. 
We use nationally representative data from the longitudinal Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP) examining perceptions of job insecurity among 
Swiss workers between 2008 and 2011, a period that registered a negative 
temporary effect on the labour market (concomitant with the crisis in the 
financial markets). Following the literature, we employ two measures to 
assess worker perceptions of job insecurity: one reveals workers’ concerns 
about job loss, and the second evaluates their degree of satisfaction with 
their job security by means of a verbal scale. 
Our analysis of the perceptions of job insecurity is structured as 
follows. Section 2 reviews measures of employment and job insecurity in 
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literature. Section 3 describes data and our measures of job insecurity. 
Results of our descriptive analysis and regression are discussed in section 4, 
where we also evaluate the extent to which the perceptions of workers are 
consistent with the current economic conditions. Section 5 presents 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background 
 
To draw significant empirical conclusions about the effects of job 
insecurity it is necessary to define and appropriately measure the concept of 
“insecurity”. “Job insecurity” is commonly intended to convey the probability 
that a worker will lose his current job and then not have a comparable 
position. Theoretical labour economists tend not to use this generic 
expression in their formal analysis of labour markets, but it is not clear 
what the term means in the theory of job search (Mortensen, 1986, 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). 
Empirical labour economists have generally avoided direct elicitation 
of workers expectations. At first they have tried to figure out the perception 
of job insecurity from the statistics on unemployment rates and durations 
(Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998; Farber, 2010). Nevertheless, reliable 
inference on expectations of achievements is difficult to achieve (Dominitz 
and Manski, 1997) because data on the labour market available to the 
researcher must be rich enough to allow the simulation of the process of 
formation of the presumed expectation. Moreover, a researcher must 
somehow know what information workers possess and how to use this 
information to form expectations. 
Direct elicitation of expectations is an alternative. In consequence, 
survey questions on job security generally appear in two major forms. Most 
commonly, individuals are invited to indicate their degree of satisfaction 
with their job security by means of questions like: 
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“How much are you satisfied with your current job or business in 
terms of job security?” 
 
followed by a verbal scale as “very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied”, 
“dissatisfied” and so on. 
However, this formulation makes the interpretation of the resulting 
measurement of the job insecurity problematic because it contains an 
important subjective element (the meaning of “satisfied” or “job security” 
can vary from person to person). Moreover, it complicates the perception of 
the respondent at least in two different components of the work: the 
probability of job loss and the cost of job loss. 
An alternative to the above formulation is the use of a probabilistic 
question, which is to ask individuals about the probability of losing their 
jobs. Here is how a typical formulation would be: 
 
“What do you think is the likelihood that you will lose your job over 
the next 12 months?” 
 
The use of probabilistic questions is supported in some recent 
contributions (Manski and Straub, 2000) because they are more robust to 
interpretation issues. 
Dickerson and Green (2012) have furthermore demonstrated the 
higher predictive power of such probabilistic questions and with regard to 
individuals’ ability to provide useful information in their responses to 
questions regarding their expectations of future job loss. Moreover, cardinal 
scales offer analytical advantages, in that marginal changes in probability 
are commensurate along the scale, which is not true of ordinal verbal 
descriptors. Finally, in the analysis of expectations and realisations 
establishes it is better to use cardinal rather than ordinal scales because the 
meaning of numerical scale points is unambiguous while that of verbal 
descriptors might differ among respondents if their understanding of 
language is heterogeneous or if the words are vague. 
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3. Data and measures of job insecurity 
 
Our individual-level analysis, covering all the Swiss Cantons, has 
been realized using the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), 
which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences 
FORS. The Swiss National Science Foundation finances this project.  
The data have been collected since 1999 through annually repeated 
surveys of households and individuals and the interdisciplinary and 
longitudinal study is well suited for representative analyses of the Swiss 
residential population. In addition to the traditional variables found in 
national household surveys (demographic characteristics, income, health, 
housing), the SHP contains a series of questions on personal relationships 
and activities outside working, as well as a number of satisfaction questions. 
Included in the latter there are question on satisfaction with job 
(in)security. According to the literature reported in Chapter 2, we studied 
both procedures mentioned above of eliciting job insecurity perceptions (Linz 
and Semykina, 2008; Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Elman and O’Rand, 
2002): 
 
 degree of satisfaction with job security (job ins); 
 probability of losing job (job loss). 
 
Two SHP questions included in each survey round address these 
issues: 
 
 “Would you say that your job is very secure, quite secure, a bit 
insecure or very insecure?” (job ins); 
 
 “How do you evaluate the risk of becoming personally 
unemployed in the next 12 months, if 0 means "no risk at all" 
and 10 "a real risk"?” (job loss). 
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In the first case, respondents were given a verbal scale, “very secure”, 
“quite secure”, “a bit insecure” or “very insecure”. 
In the second case, respondents were given an 11-point Likert scale, 
where 0 reflected a positive assessment (confidence - "no risk at all") and 10 
reflected a negative assessment (fear - "a real risk"). The variable is recoded 
for the econometric analysis, such that it takes the value of 1 if people are 
not concerned at all about their job security, 2 if they are fairly concerned, 3 
if they are concerned and 4 if they are very concerned. 
 Substantial similarities between the SHP questions and questions 
cited in the literature on developed market economies facilitate the 
comparison of our results with those of other studies. 
Our sample was restricted to the civilian workforce, aged 15- 65: the 
size of the resulting sample is 10,879 observations. 
The SHP provides individual and job-specific control variables: we 
selected the set of explanatory variables according to previous studies that 
have defined the determinants of job insecurity perceptions (Linz and 
Semykina, 2008; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005; Green et al. 2000; Manski 
and Straub 2000; Näswall and De Witte 2003; Nickell et al. 2002). 
Individual-specific control variables are gender, which distinguishes 
between male and female employees, marital status, between married and 
not married workers, presence of children in the household, education, 
defined on three levels, nationality, between Swiss citizens and foreigners, 
and age, measured in years. 
With respect to job-specific attributes, the control variables include 
the wage, the type of employment, and a public service indicator. Full-time 
and part-time constitute a dummy variable set, such that each worker can 
be assigned to one of these categories at any point of time. Fixed-term and 
temporary work, constitute a separate dummy set. These variables capture 
possible increases in job insecurity due to an expansion of non-standard jobs 
in the market (Garz, 2012). 
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In order to allow for the possibility that the contribution of different 
factors to perceptions of job insecurity varied over time we perform 
estimation separately for two years: the period of relative stability, before 
the declining of the economy (2008) and the period of major economic 
uncertainty, after the economic downturn (2011). We provide summary 
statistics for the samples used in particular descriptive and regression 
analyses in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
At first we analyse economic insecurity examining unconditional 
effects: on the average, only 10% of the workers expressed concerns about 
job ins, both in 2008 and in 2001, while at the contrary job loss was 17,9% in 
2008 and 18,4% in 2011. 
The same situation holds for gender differences in perceptions of job 
insecurity: data show a large gender difference considering job loss as 
insecurity measure. 
Workers with university education and those who have higher 
education are more likely to perceive their jobs as secure.  
According to literature, finally, job loss tend to increase with age up to 
the point when workers reach retirement age, and decline afterward. In 
contrast, job ins increases monotonically with age. Considering occupational 
differences data confirm results found in previous studies (Linz and 
Semykina, 2008; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005). Occupations associated 
with state sector employment have low perceptions of job insecurity, and the 
insecurity, as expected, declines over the course of the considered period. In 
fact, their jobs are more secure than a private job in a downturn period. The 
least concerned about their economic situation are nevertheless supervisors 
and managers. 
Regarding differences in local labour market conditions, perceptions 
of job insecurity are positively related: workers living in areas with better 
labour market outcomes (North Western Switzerland) are less likely to feel 
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insecure than workers living in other regions, especially in border regions. A 
remarkable result is that workers residing in Ticino showed in 2008 low 
levels of insecurity, while in 2011 they were the most concerned workers in 
Switzerland, maybe because of a displacement fear (Angrist, and Kugler, 
2002). In fact, in the considered period the number of economically active 
foreign nationals in Ticino reached the 25% of active population, the highest 
value in Switzerland. 
  Workers living in small town were relatively optimistic about their 
job security than workers living in metropolitan areas during the considered 
period. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Regression results: perceptions of job insecurity in 
Switzerland 
 
To account for the ordered categorical character of the dependent 
variables, we used ordered probit regressions, with our two measures of job 
insecurity (job ins and job loss):  
 
y*i = ISi +JSi + i + i   (1) 
 
where i denotes individuals i, i = 1…N. The latent dependent variable 
y* is perceived job insecurity, IS contains individual-specific regressors and 
JS refers to job specific regressors. The errors  are assumed logistically 
distributed and independent across individuals for given values of the 
regressors and the random intercept. 
We perform estimation separately for 2008 and 2011, using, in our 
regression analysis, cross-sectional estimation techniques. For each 
dependent variable, the lowest value of the measure reflects the most 
favourable outcome (security-confidence) and the highest value reflects the 
most adverse outcome (insecurity-fear). 
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Table 3 presents the estimation results from Ordered Probit 
regressions of perceived job security on the set of controls that we described 
in the previous paragraph. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
First, we expected temporary workers to be most responsive in terms 
of job insecurity as temporary jobs are more exposed to the risk of job loss. 
Effectively for temporary workers there is a sensible job security difference, 
being the coefficient for this category of workers positive and strongly 
significant. Coefficients for 2011, both for job loss and job ins are lower than 
coefficients for 2008; this could be interpreted to reflect the generally less 
favourable conditions in the labour market in 2011, and a general higher 
“feeling” of job insecurity. 
 
4.1 Age 
Partly according to the descriptive analysis, but in contrast with what 
is often found in the analysis of subjective well-being measures (Clark, 
1996), we do not clearly find that job security, expressed both as job loss or 
job ins, is decreasing and convex (U-shaped) in age.  
 
4.2 Education 
Education seems to play only a small role in terms of job security. For 
2008, only the coefficient for job ins of low educated workers is positive and 
significant: in 2008 the economic downturn, in effect, concerned only the 
financial sector.  This, as discussed before, may be also taken to reflect the 
fact that this formulation makes the interpretation of the resulting 
measurement of the job insecurity problematic because of it confuses the 
perception of the respondent in the probability of job loss and the cost of job 
loss.  
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4.3 Gender and marital status 
The point estimate for married workers is negative, but statistically 
significant only in 2008. Hence, there is some mitigated evidence that 
married workers felt less secure than single workers do before the economic 
downturn. As in previous studies (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005) neither 
cohabitation nor the presence of children in the household affect job security 
in any systematic way, both in case of married or non-married couples. 
In both regressions for 2008 and 2011, perceptions of job insecurity 
are lower among women in 2008 and higher in 2011 but not significant. 
These findings are partly in line with patterns observed in other developed 
economies, where gender differences in perceptions of job insecurity were 
found to be negligible (Elman and O’Rand, 2002). When job insecurity is 
measured by job loss, gender differences in perceptions are higher and 
significant for 2008. This result is striking: one would expect, according to 
literature, being a female should reduce perceived job security. A possible 
interpretation here is that this is due to the high female participation rate 
in Switzerland.  
 
4.4 Region, unemployment and foreigners rate 
Once we control for other factors, we can see a clear relationship 
between perceptions and region of residence. Perceptions of job insecurity 
tend to be higher among workers in regions characterized by better labour 
market outcomes. Moreover, there is evidence that foreign-born workers feel 
more insecure than natives do, as discussed by Green et al. (2000) and Clark 
and Postel-Vinay (2005). 
Nevertheless, as one would expect, the average local unemployment 
rate or foreign rate should reduce perceived job security: the effect is 
positive but insignificant.  
In 2011, therefore, the negative impact of the region of residence on 
job loss is rather high and significant at the 1% level, indicating that during 
the period of substantial uncertainty, workers were roughly equally 
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concerned about a chance of losing their jobs, regardless of whether the 
unemployment rate was high or low. 
Among workers residing in small towns, perceptions of job loss were 
relatively high in 2008 but decreased in 2011: urban-rural differences 
diminished over time. 
 
4.5 Comments 
Our results are in general consistent with findings based on data 
collected in European economies and they seem to match reality fairly well.  
In Europe, according to the fifth European survey into working conditions 
(2010), workers felt secure until 2008, and then the job insecurity started to 
rise in almost all the European countries. 
 Since then, with the progressive deterioration of macroeconomic 
conditions, workers’ views of their own job situation are rather pessimistic 
and perceptions of job security are higher in countries where employment 
opportunities are scarcer. 
The substantial concern among older workers in 2011 about finding a 
new job is similar to results reported in studies conducted in developed 
market economies and is consistent with the fact that, in the Swiss labour 
market, as in the US market, unemployment spells tend to be longer among 
older workers (Neumark and Button, 2014).  
Finally, the statistical non-significance of the average local 
unemployment rate or foreign rate on job security, versus the significant 
effect of the coefficient of the region of residence, shows a simple correlation. 
Perceptions on the local unemployment are included in a general perception 
of the socio-demographic background of employees, caught by the regional 
coefficient. As discussed by Graf (2008), “media effects” (the general media 
coverage of labour market policy) could affect individual perceptions of job 
insecurity. 
Moreover, a rise in perceptions of job security (measured as job ins) 
over time among Swiss would suggest that workers are biased in the 
assessments they make of their own job security. Our results seem to 
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confirm the necessity to use cardinal rather than ordinal scales (Dickerson 
and Green, 2012). Verbal descriptors might differ among respondents if 
their understanding of language is heterogeneous or if the words are vague 
while the meaning of numerical scale points is unambiguous; cardinal scales 
are consequently preferable.  
Nevertheless, it is an open question as to whether the responses on 
cardinal scales in practice can capture valid representations of what 
workers expect, given that not all respondents can show a perfect 
understanding of the questions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We examined perceptions of economic insecurity in Switzerland, 
during the business cycle between 2008 and 2011. We find that perceptions 
of Swiss workers are similar to those obtained from studies conducted in 
other European economies: perceptions of job security tend to be higher 
among workers with supervisory responsibilities, among permanent 
workers and among workers who live in regions that are not adversely 
affected by economic conditions. Perceived job security in non-public sector 
jobs is lower than in public sector jobs, which seem to be more “universally” 
perceived as safe jobs and protected from labour market shocks. 
Unlike previous studies, however, we find that perceptions do not 
strongly differ between workers with different levels of education and age is 
not strictly positively correlated with confidence in keeping one’s current 
job. 
 Workers perceptions are consistent with actual labour market 
conditions: due to the good performance of the Swiss labour market, the 
overall feeling of job insecurity appear to be less prevalent in Switzerland 
than in the rest of Europe. However, perceptions of economic security were 
very high in years of economic stability (until 2008), and deteriorated after 
the period of major uncertainty (2011). In both periods, workers with 
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relatively weak positions in the labour market tended to have higher 
perceptions of job insecurity.  
The findings have important implications from a theoretical 
perspective and from a policy perspective. 
From a theoretical point of view, this study contributes to the 
literature by studying important variables that help to explain the 
formation of job insecurity perceptions. The findings emphasize the need to 
critically question rationality assumptions in many economic models, 
especially if these models involve perceptions or expectations (Dickerson 
and Green, 2012). 
Policy makers should be aware that policy-specific information is 
processed with a bias; otherwise, policies may have unanticipated economic 
consequences. 
Further research is necessary to investigate other important aspects 
of the job security-perceptions relationship. In particular, it seems 
potentially valuable to assess the longitudinal dimension of the data to try 
to account for selection problems. Moreover, it may be the case that the level 
of job protection and the level of job insecurity are driving factors into the 
overall worker’s job satisfaction. 
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Figure 1 - Fear of losing one's job and job satisfaction*. 
*Data refer to 2005 and 2010 for European Union countries and Switzerland. The figure 
presents the percentage on the active occupied saying that they are “concerned or very 
concerned” about their job security or “satisfied or very satisfied” with their job. 
 
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions survey - 2010. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
    2008 2011 
Individual and local 
characteristics 
age Age (continuous) 40.04155 21.9758 41.62218 22.46824
age2 Squared age (continuous) 2086.217 1837.029 2237.182 1926.938
female 1 if female 0.5161172 0.4997631 0.518519 0.499679
married 1 if married 0.4620474 0.4985804 0.465539 0.498833
children 
1 if not-married couple with 
children 0.0126803 0.1118959 0.018109 0.13335
marchildren 1 if married couple with children 0.4989433 0.5000219 0.473599 0.499325
young 1 if age<31 0.3586727 0.4796329 0.34846 0.476504
middleaged 1 if age>31 & age<50 0.2932255 0.4552618 0.26647 0.442133
older 1 if age>50 0.3481018 0.4763904 0.38507 0.486634
swiss 1 if Swiss citizen 0.8896755 0.3133082 0.897592 0.303198
eduinf 1 if primary educaton 0.2997132 0.458155 0.28287 0.450415
edumid 
1 if apprenticeship, full-time 
vocational school 0.5136952 0.4998371 0.517721 0.49971
edusup 1 if high school, university 0.1865915 0.3896025 0.199409 0.399575
small_town 
1 if 1 if lives in small or middle 
sized town 0.0815502 0.2736908 0.084273 0.277809
large_town 1 if 1 if lives in large town 0.1882634 0.3909403 0.187422 0.390267
Job characteristics 
lowinc 1 if low income 0.3665005 0.481903 0.343104 0.474796
midinc 1 if medium income 0.1946179 0.3959489 0.194472 0.395834
highinc 1 if high income 0.3705134 0.4829971 0.398183 0.489575
temporary 1 if temporary job 0.1379915 0.3449342 0.135625 0.342429
parttime 1 if part-time job 0.4709241 0.4992067 0.48856 0.499918
proftrain 1 if doing professional training 0.2952797 0.4562083 0.270121 0.444057
public 1 if public sector job 0.3914286 0.4881333 0.387183 0.487165
professional 1 if professionals 0.1685297 0.3743762 0.167367 0.37334
hightech 1 if higher supervisory/technicians 0.2416165 0.4281091 0.238952 0.426486
desk 1 if intermediate occupations 0.1958298 0.3968807 0.196961 0.397742
self 1 if self employed 0.0694325 0.2542155 0.065987 0.248284
lowtech 
1 if lower supervisors and 
technicians 0.0214961 0.1450468 0.022596 0.148625
service 1 if lower sales and service 0.11135 0.3145988 0.119176 0.324028
technical 1 if  lower technical 0.1003869 0.3005475 0.097181 0.296233
routine 1 if routine job 0.0913586 0.2881493 0.091782 0.288746
Region of residence 
r1 1 if Lake Geneva (VD, VS, GE) 0.1757737 0.380645 0.177223 0.381875
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
    2008 2011 
r2 
1 if Middleland (BE, FR, SO, NE, 
JU) 0.2420792 0.4283616 0.248703 0.432281
r3 
1 if North-west Switzerland (BS, 
BL, AG) 0.142621 0.349702 0.141886 0.348949
r4 1 if Zurich 0.1762329 0.3810357 0.16613 0.372214
r5 
1 if East Switzerland (GL, SH, AR, 
AI, SG, GR, TG) 0.1301313 0.3364633 0.126677 0.332626
r6 
1 if Central Switzerland (LU, UR, 
SZ, OW, NW, ZG) 0.0970704 0.2960673 0.099302 0.299081
r7 1 if Ticino 0.0360915 0.1865263 0.040079 0.196153
Political party 
left 1 if left 0.2433657 0.4291487 0.245611 0.430482
centre 1 if centre 0.5639159 0.4959381 0.536341 0.498716
right 1 if right 0.0957929 0.2943308 0.111488 0.314759
      
Macroeconomic 
condition 
for Local foreing rate 21.45856 6.092793 22.51885 6.306033
un Local unemployment rate 2.569419 .9933502 3.151235 1.188648
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Table 2 - Percent of workers who feel most vulnerable, by period 
Description 
Concerned about a 
chance of losing job1 
Concerned about job 
security2 
      2008 2011   2008 2011 
Overall 17.94 18.4 10 9.22 
female - 18.12 19.22 10.28 9.74 
male - 17.75 17.5 9.7 8.65 
married married 17.74 18.1 9.5 9.52 
children 
1 if not-married couple 
with children 
 22 13.33  18.36 7.69 
marchildren 
1 if married couple with 
children 
 17.46 18.02  8.98 8.78 
young age<31 18.61 16.68 8.85 5.49 
middleaged age>31 & age<50 19.1 19.61 9.95 9.71 
older age>50 15.67 18.01 11.47 11.15 
eduinf primary educaton 18.58 19.7 8.53 8.31 
edumid 
apprenticeship, full-time 
vocational school 18.77 19.85 6.37 8.66 
edusup high school, university 15.35 14.44 12.18 10.72 
small_town 
lives in small or middle 
sized town 20.7 17.84 11.02 7.99 
large_town lives in large town 17.83 20.86 11.38 10.33 
lowinc low income  21.28 20.29  12.34 11.07 
midinc medium income  17.91 21.19  9.57 10.12 
highinc high income  15.58 16.56  8.48 8.77 
public public sector job 14.55 13.87 9.31 8.61 
temporary temporary job 20.81 19.37 15.72 14.2 
parttime part-time job 19.07 18.94 11.29 10.54 
professional professionals 13.96 16.19 10.45 9.92 
hightech 
higher 
supervisory/technicians 16.37 16.25 10.97 10.05 
desk intermediate occupations 17.15 18.02 8.45 7.69 
self self employed 15.15 15.85 13.77 15.33 
lowtech 
lower supervisors and 
technicians 12.95 18.79 7.29 6.6 
service lower sales and service 21.24 19.46 8.42 7.52 
technical lower technical 18.08 17.08 9.33 8.98 
routine routine job 19.32 22.47 11.35 7.98 
r1 
Lake Geneva (VD, VS, 
GE) 24.48 23.42 10.22 8.72 
r2 
Middleland (BE, FR, 
SO, NE, JU) 16.69 17.84 8.09 6.62 
Regional labour market analysis and policy evaluation: job insecurity, flexibility and complexity 
38 
 
 
Description  
Concerned about a 
chance of losing job1 
 Concerned about job 
security2 
      2008 2011   2008 2011 
r3 
North-west Switzerland 
(BS, BL, AG) 17.06 17.7 13.36 10.81 
r4 Zurich 18.06 20.16 12.88 12.14 
r5 
East Switzerland (GL, 
SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, 
TG) 13.97 13.94 7.84 6.94 
r6 
Central Switzerland 
(LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, 
ZG) 17.61 14.1 8.84 11.26 
r7 Ticino   14.16 23.49   3.51 11.33 
left left  20.45 10.97  19.52 9.91 
centre centre  18.01 9.85  19.65 9.41 
right right  18.84 10.01  19.66 7.51 
        
1 Respondents were included in this group if said they were “concerned” or “very concerned. 
2 Respondents were included in this group if said they were “a bit insecure” or “very insecure”. 
(See Par. 2) 
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Table 3 – Ordered probit estimates for degree of satisfaction with job security (job  ins) and 
probability of losing job (job loss), by period 
  Concerned about a chance of 
losing job (job loss) 
Concerned about job 
security 
(job ins) 
2008 2011 2008 2011 
age 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.126*** 0.117*** 
[0.025] [0.022] [0.024] [0.021] 
age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
female -0.113* 0.046 -0.097 0.025 
[0.064] [0.061] [0.065] [0.063] 
married -0.216*** -0.022 -0.175*** -0.064 
[0.069] [0.064] [0.066] [0.065] 
children -0.042 -0.205 0.085 -0.329* 
[0.186] [0.173] [0.202] [0.175] 
marchildren 0.055 0.024 0.069 0.007 
[0.064] [0.059] [0.062] [0.060] 
young 0.090 -0.044 0.228* -0.036 
[0.125] [0.125] [0.129] [0.132] 
older 0.144 0.094 0.074 0.205** 
[0.103] [0.088] [0.095] [0.087] 
swiss -0.119 -0.164** -0.153* -0.101 
[0.081] [0.079] [0.083] [0.077] 
eduinf 0.111 0.087 0.155 0.255*** 
[0.105] [0.100] [0.101] [0.092] 
edusup -0.089 -0.067 0.053 0.004 
[0.060] [0.058] [0.061] [0.060] 
small_town 0.277*** 0.064 0.248*** 0.068 
[0.085] [0.087] [0.088] [0.079] 
large_town 0.018 0.008 -0.005 0.068 
[0.062] [0.060] [0.061] [0.059] 
lowinc 0.363*** -0.039 0.209*** 0.015 
[0.073] [0.074] [0.074] [0.073] 
highinc 0.043 -0.169** -0.074 -0.087 
[0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.066] 
temporary 0.987*** 0.595*** 0.965*** 0.793*** 
[0.105] [0.105] [0.117] [0.114] 
parttime -0.145** -0.235*** -0.104 -0.063 
[0.065] [0.064] [0.066] [0.066] 
proftrain -0.006 -0.064 -0.022 -0.066 
[0.048] [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] 
public -0.465*** -0.460*** -0.340*** -0.436*** 
[0.054] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050] 
professional 0.187* 0.012 0.115 0.123 
[0.112] [0.107] [0.113] [0.104] 
hightech 0.252** -0.116 0.132 0.054 
[0.103] [0.100] [0.104] [0.093] 
desk 0.217** -0.014 0.084 0.088 
[0.102] [0.098] [0.103] [0.092] 
lowtech -0.221 0.017 -0.154 0.005 
[0.214] [0.161] [0.186] [0.156] 
service 0.246** -0.048 0.017 0.124 
[0.110] [0.107] [0.109] [0.097] 
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Concerned about a chance of 
losing job (job loss) 
Concerned about job 
security 
(job ins) 
     
 2008 2011 2008 2011 
technical 0.192 -0.105 0.191 0.158 
[0.118] [0.112] [0.118] [0.107] 
left 0.042 -0.034 0.052 -0.056 
[0.055] [0.053] [0.054] [0.055] 
right -0.101 -0.098 -0.062 -0.115 
[0.099] [0.087] [0.094] [0.080] 
r1 -0.057 -0.116 -0.323** -0.264** 
[0.136] [0.105] [0.135] [0.106] 
r2 -0.102 -0.194** -0.146 -0.175* 
[0.107] [0.091] [0.107] [0.093] 
r3 -0.100 -0.263*** 0.064 -0.044 
[0.085] [0.080] [0.085] [0.081] 
r5 -0.139 -0.289*** -0.086 -0.150* 
[0.091] [0.092] [0.091] [0.088] 
r6 -0.102 -0.213** -0.090 -0.018 
[0.102] [0.096] [0.102] [0.097] 
r7 -0.248 -0.390** -0.431** -0.098 
[0.220] [0.175] [0.216] [0.169] 
for -0.008 -0.004 0.002 0.004 
[0.013] [0.010] [0.013] [0.010] 
un 0.078 0.063 0.020 -0.005 
[0.100] [0.058] [0.099] [0.058] 
Observations 2,508 2,702 2,515 2,712 
Robust standard errors in brackets                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Refercence categories: workers with no higher education, age>31 & age<50, 
routine job, medium income, Zurich region 
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Abstract 
 
The effects on employment of the recent economic crisis have become 
evident and persistent in many OECD countries, exacerbating on the one 
hand the demand for more flexibility by the firms – with subsequent 
frequent transitions between employment and unemployment – , on the 
other the need to ensure workers security. “Flexicurity”, an institutional 
frame which couples firms flexibility with workers’ security, has been 
defined as a successful model at the EU level before the crisis. 
The objective of this paper is therefore to empirically assess the effect 
of a micro-level measure of flexicurity on workers’ job satisfaction over the 
business cycle using individual-level data from the longitudinal Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP), related to temporary and permanent employees in 
Switzerland for the period 2005 to 2011. Switzerland provides a particularly 
appropriate market to examine the potential effects of flexicurity type 
arrangements due to the relatively high incidence of flexible employment 
contracts. To this end, the sample of workers is disaggregated into different 
groups according to their employment contract (permanent or temporary) 
and their perceived job security; we therefore analyse whether workers who 
are heterogeneous in terms of both the type of labour contract and their 
perceived security do also differ with regard to life satisfaction and specific 
aspects of the job satisfaction. Usually satisfaction variables, given the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable, are analysed using ordered probit 
models. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2006), however, developed a 
procedure, called Probit OLS or POLS, that consists in transforming an 
ordinal dependent variable in a “pseudo” continuous one, and allows the 
application of a linear model. With longitudinal data the POLS method 
permits for the inclusion of individual level fixed or random effects, wich are 
not always easily implementable with non linear and ordered models. Our 
methodology estimates a linear fixed effects model, thus controlling for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics. We also extend our analysis and 
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seek to identify how insecurity affects temporary workers compared to 
permanent workers examining the impact of regional labour market 
conditions: we examine the effects on relative satisfaction and perceptions of 
security on workers in the seven Swiss statistical regions. 
Our results show that job stability and perceived security are not 
necessarily associated, and that job satisfaction is relatively low, mainly 
when perceived job security is low. The relationship between wellbeing and 
job security also varies according to regional employment conditions. This 
indicates that the duration of the contract may be less important if the 
worker perceives that he is not at risk of unemployment; in this regard, 
from a point of view of policy, a greater “flexicurity” can be obtained either 
directly from employer, adopting changes in work organization, or indirectly 
by policy makers through an appropriate mix of active labour market 
policies. 
 
JEL codes: J28, J81 
 
Keywords:  job satisfaction, Flexicurity, unobserved heterogeneity 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last couple of decades, because of the intensification of 
competitiveness due to market globalization together with the spread of new 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), policy makers have 
been trying to enhance the flexibility and improve the performance of 
European labour markets through the application of extensive labour 
market reforms. An aspect of these reforms has been the simplification of 
the restrictions regulating the use of temporary employment contracts 
(OECD, 2006) and the wide spreading of temporary work and so-called 
flexible contracts such as fixed-term contracts, seasonal jobs and temporary 
agency work. After a first period of increasing feeling of insecurity, during 
the ’90 it decreased, although with important differences between European 
countries (Auer and Cazes, 2003). In spite of the economic and institutional 
differences, these countries have the same main problem: how to promote 
sustainable economic growth, which entails maintaining bigh 
competitiveness also through flexibility without harming workers 
employment and income security, which may cause poverty and social 
exclusion. 
Moreover, the effects on employment of the recent economic crisis 
have become evident and persistent in many OECD countries, exacerbating 
on the one hand the demand for more flexibility by the firms – with 
subsequent frequent transitions between employment and unemployment –, 
on the other the need to ensure workers security. 
During the last years, indeed, the number of non-permanent forms of 
employment, as fixed-term employment and temporary agency work, has 
enormously increased resulting in a substantial relative growth in “flexible” 
employment. In response to the crisis, at the EU level, “Flexicurity”, an 
institutional frame implementing a progressive flexibility of the labour 
market and at the same time guaranteeing its stability, has been defined as 
a popular model. 
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[Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
 
The objective of this paper is therefore to empirically assess the 
effect of a micro-level measure of flexicurity on workers’ job 
satisfaction in Switzerland. Job satisfaction will be considered as a 
cognitive factor, as the extent of the individual’s satisfaction with 
particular aspects of his job: our focus on estimating the joint effect of 
fixed-term employment and institutional context on job satisfaction is 
associated with the estimation of different socio-economic variables. 
We consider both the type of contract (permanent or temporary) and 
the perceived security, measured by asking individuals about the 
probability that they assign to losing their jobs.  
 
2. Background 
 
In principle, temporary employment can have both positive and 
negative welfare consequences for workers. A flexible scheduling 
arrangement and other aspects of the daily work experience related to 
temporary work, indeed, may be valued and preferred by some employees, 
whereas the insecurity and poorer working conditions associated with these 
contract types can have a negative impact on workers’ welfare (Blanchard 
and Landier, 2002). Employment stability is instead desirable both for 
workers, who rank it as one of the most important factors for job satisfaction 
(European Commission, 2001), and for firms, which dislike high turnover 
and prefer stable employment relationships in order to retain human capital 
investment and reduce both workforce screening and selection costs. On the 
other hand, the recent intensification of competitive pressures has called for 
more flexibility in labour markets for both firms and workers. 
Since the ’70, psychologists and sociologists have been extensively 
analyzing “job satisfaction” (wich can be defined as a subjective measure of 
how people feel about their job), and starting from Hamermesh (1977) and 
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Freeman (1978) this variable has been also recognized as an important 
economic variable in order to describe the economic life and the personal 
behavior in the labour market. According to recent economic literature, job 
satisfaction, wich can be thought as a multidimensional construct involving 
subjective aspirations and objective opportunities, is important for at least 
two reasons: it increases the productivity of labour and therefore the 
productivity of firms and it can improve overall social well-being, being 
closely related to individual happiness and well-being (Bruno, Caroleo and 
Dessy, 2013). 
A growing number of studies have investigated the determinants and 
consequences of differences in individuals’ reported job satisfaction. 
Research in psychology and sociology has emphasized that job satisfaction 
depends not only on the remuneration for the job but also on other 
workplace characteristics like career prospects, job security, job content, 
autonomy at work, and interpersonal relationships. Most of the studies in 
this strand of research show that job security and job content are the most 
influential determinants when it comes to explaining job satisfaction 
(D’Addio et al., 2007, De Cuyper et al., 2009). 
Seeing the economic dimension of job satisfaction, it should be 
considered as a utility function, and it should depend on salary or income 
and then decrease in working hours (Clark and Oswald, 1996), all other 
things being equal. In this case, the lower wage of temporary workers shoud 
imply that they are discounting the cost of filling the job experience or skills 
gap and the cost of the time needed to gather information in a search for the 
best match. Therefore, the lower satisfaction of temporary workers, found in 
most of the empirical research, should be the motivation driving them 
towards stable employment, which is ranked as one of the most important 
factors of satisfaction (European Commission, 2001). It could be even linked 
to occupations and jobs that will ensure the best correspondence between 
the ability of a worker and professional requirements (Eurofound, 2007). 
Several studies have consequently looked at the effect of temporary 
contracts on job satisfaction examining the relation between job satisfaction 
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of workers with fixed-term contracts; the evidence is instead mixed. Bardasi 
and Francesconi (2000), De Graaf-Zijl (2012) and De Witte and Naswall 
(2003) find a negative impact only for specific forms of temporary 
employment, especially for temporary work and seasonal jobs, or for aspects 
regarding job stability. To the contrary, they do not find a significant 
difference in overall job satisfaction between permanent and temporary 
workers. 
While some studies do not show statistically significant differences in 
job satisfaction between workers in permanent jobs and those with fixed-
term contracts (D’Addio et al., 2007, Bardasi and Francesconi, 2004), others 
find significantly lower job satisfaction among fixed-term workers (Booth et 
al., 2002, Clark and Oswald, 1996, Petrongolo, 2004). De Graaf-Zijl (2008) 
and Green and Heywood (2007) in addition look at the job satisfaction of 
temporary agency workers in the Netherlands and the UK, respectively. 
Both studies indicate that agency workers are significantly less satisfied 
with their jobs compared to workers with other types of contracts. Green 
and Heywood (2007) to some extent confirm the results of De Graaf-Zijl 
(2008) for the UK, finding that, after controlling for satisfaction with several 
different job characteristics, flexible workers are more satisfied, and arguing 
that, although flexible contracts provide less satisfaction with job security, 
other aspects of the job compensate so that overall satisfaction appears 
similar. Interestingly, they find indeed that flexible workers are generally 
even more satisfied with their remuneration, working time, and work 
content than permanent workers. However, in contrast to the Dutch 
findings, they show that satisfaction with job security is the main 
determinant of overall job satisfaction. Using the Eurobarometer, Origo and 
Pagani (2009), by measuring flexibility through the type of contract and 
security through perceived job security, show that, in countries with 
generous unemployment insurance systems, fixed-term workers are not 
significantly less satisfied with their jobs.  
Beckmann et al. (2007) provide evidence that fixed-term workers in 
Germany might be even more satisfied with their jobs. 
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Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the 
period 1995-2001, Salvatori (2010) analyzes how changes in restrictions on 
the use of temporary employment contracts affect job satisfaction 
identifying a negative effect on the well-being of all workers when 
regulations on temporary work contracts are tightened. As for fixed-term 
workers, his results indicate that job satisfaction increases when 
restrictions on the use of flexible employment forms are loosened. The 
reason might be that stricter regulations on temporary employment cause 
the labour market to deteriorate. Consequently, the job-finding rate for 
workers who are at risk of losing their jobs declines and their job 
satisfaction decreases. However, as soon as he includes country-specific time 
trends, the results lose any significance. 
Finally, Theodossiou and Vasileiou (2007) study the relationship 
between job satisfaction and job security measured in terms of 
unemployment expectations. After controlling for the potential endogeneity 
of the job satisfaction-job security relationship, they find that higher job 
security is linked to higher job satisfaction. However, they do not consider 
the effect of the type of contract. 
The main important issue, regarding this strand of the research is 
therefore to determine what factors influence the perception of security in 
the workplace and its impact on the welfare of workers. A first hypothesis 
concern how the macroeconomic environment interact with the implemented 
policies and the overall functioning of the labour market. Some recent 
studies have considered the impacts of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and unemployment benefit (UB), used alternatively to reduce the risk 
of unemployment. However, results are diversified. Postel-Vinay and Saint 
Martin (2007) and European Commission (2007) find that UB work better 
than EPL in promoting job security, arguing that stricter EPL for 
permanent workers encourages the growth of flexibility “at the margin” 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Boeri et al., 2012). In countries with higher EPL 
workers may feel more insecure because they cannot count on the safety net 
provided by UB if they lose their jobs. In contrast, in countries with low EPL 
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and high UB active labor market policies (flexicurity scheme), even 
temporary workers can feel confident and happy with their jobs.  
In summary, the economic literature identifies two different 
relationships between job security and flexibility: 
- the “trade-off” theory, which implies a negative relationship 
between flexibility and security. According to this hypothesis a high level of 
job security can only be achieved at the cost of poor flexibility and flexible 
employment patterns are in conflict with job security; 
- the “flexicurity" approach, which instead assumes that 
flexibility and security are not contradictions, but they can be mutually 
supportive, with the implementation of the right labour market policy. 
The flexicurity model has been initially implemented in Denmark and 
in The Netherlands combining active labour market policies, mainly focused 
on active job search and training, with low employment protection 
legislation (numerical flexibility) and a generous system of unemployment 
benefits (social security). Consequently, the main idea behind flexicurity is 
to achieve a shift from job security (same job for his-her entire working life) 
to the employment security, which is having the possibility of permanent 
employment. 
More in general, there are still few micro econometric studies showing 
the joint effect of perceived job security and the type of contract on job 
satisfaction. 
 
3. The Swiss case 
 
In this regard, it is of particular interest to look at the experience of 
Switzerland, wich is a federal republic consisting of 26 regions (cantons). It 
has currently about 8.036 million inhabitants, corresponding to a population 
density of about 191 people per km² despite the country’s mountainous 
character; about three quarters of the population live in urban areas. The 
native language of about 66% of the population is German, 23% French and 
8% Italian. Based on the original 1874 Constitution, political institutions 
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have been characterised by considerable stability and consensus-building, 
with a government coalition traditionally formed by the four biggest parties. 
The legislative process is largely decentralised, with a strong role given to 
the cantons and to elements of direct democracy. Switzerland has a long 
tradition of neutrality, and is one of the few remaining members of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), rather than the European Union, 
although the latter accounts for most of its foreign trade; only in 2002 did 
the country join the United Nations. 
For this reason, there is large regional variation in Switzerland, 
concerning financial capacity, employment patterns, unemployment levels 
and welfare dependency. For example, per-capita income in the canton of 
Basel-City, the highest in Switzerland, is more than twice that of the canton 
of Obwalden. In general, the southwestern (French and Italian-speaking) 
cantons show less advantageous labour market outcomes than their 
German-speaking counterparts. 
Over the past three decades, the Swiss labour force has grown from 
about 3 million to 4.8 million people. In most respects, the labour market 
has performed above average: compared to other OECD countries the Swiss 
labour market is therefore characterised by high employment rates, low 
unemployment and high wage levels. The main factors underlying this good 
performance are normally considered to be a high degree of labour market 
flexibility, with decentralised wage bargaining and relatively low 
employment protection regulations, supported by a strong focus (at least 
since the mid-1990s) on active labour market policies and employment 
services characterised by strong “mutual-obligation” principles. Another 
feature of labour market performance has been the design of immigration 
policies, which in the past implied the use of immigrant labour as a labour 
supply reserve that left the country in times of economic hardship (see 
OECD, 2013; Gerfin, 2007).  
Hovewever, Switzerland has not escaped the global economic 
downturn starting in 2008. GDP growth became negative in the second half 
of the year, and stayed negative in 2009; economic growth then resumed 
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strongly in 2010. The impact of the recession on the labour market, at first 
relatively modest, nevertheless led to a 30% rise in unemployment, from 
3.5% in 2008 to 4.4% in 2009, and only recently it has been starting going 
down (4.1% in 2013 - last quarter). 
Although already at a high level, female employment has kept 
growing since the mid-1990s, and recent labour force growth is almost 
entirely due to women. At almost 61.2% in 2012, female employment was a 
full 6 points above the OECD average (although still behind levels in Nordic 
countries). 
The high share of part time in total employment (26.0% in 2012, 
compared with an OECD average of 16.9%) plays some role in explaining 
the high Swiss female employment rate. In fact, adjusted for hours worked, 
female employment would only be at a mid-field position among OECD 
countries. The share of temporary among total employment was 13% in 
2013, slightly above the OECD average (12%), with high regional 
etherogeneity.  
As can be expected, the evolution of sectoral employment shares 
reflects the advanced tertiarisation of the economy. The transit from an 
industrial to a service economy implied an important change of the sector of 
employment of the working population in the industrial sector. Even if the 
employment rate in the service sector rose considerably (from 39% to 73,7% 
in 2011), compared to other European States, Switzerland has still a high 
employment ratio in different sectors and a high level of employment in 
manufacturing branches. 
 
4. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
Our analysis is based on individual-level data from the longitudinal 
Swiss Household Panel (SHP)1, related to temporary and permanent 
employees in Switzerland for the period 2005 to 2011. The panel offers 
                                                          
1 The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social 
Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
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information on individuals living in all the Swiss cantons and the SHP 
questionnaires cover a wide range of subjects (as employment status and 
working conditions, occupational and family biographies and personality 
traits, education, training and social security). 
A first reason using Swiss figures is the availability of high-quality 
panel data: 14 waves of the Swiss household panel (SHP, 2000–2013, as 
described by FORS, 2013). We restrict our sample to respondents who were 
in paid and dependent employment, from 2005 to 2011: this provides us 
with a total of around 4’200 person-years for Switzerland. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Our dependent variable is people’s self-reported subjective well-being 
and is based on the question “How satisfied are you at present with your job 
as a whole?”, with answers ranging from 0 (totally dissatisfied) to 10 (totally 
satisfied). The variable’s distribution is shown in Figure 4. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
To evaluate the degree of security, we used the probabilistic question 
asking individuals about the probability that they assign to losing their jobs. 
The exact question is “How likely or unlikely is that you will lose your job 
for some reason over the next twelve months?”, with answers ranging from 0 
(no risk at all) to 10 (a real risk). In light of the set of possible answers, we 
considered as “insecure” workers those stating that they were very likely or 
quite likely to lose their jobs (answer greater than 5) in the twelve months 
following the survey. 
As discussed before, Switzerland provides a particularly appropriate 
market to examine the potential effects of flexicurity type arrangements. 
To this end, following the measure of flexibility and security at the 
micro-level proposed by Origo and Pagani (2009), the sample of workers is 
classified into four groups (types) according to their employment contract 
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(permanent or temporary) and their perceived job security: “flexicure 
workers”, who are on temporary contracts stating that they are not very 
likely to lose their jobs in the following twelve months, “insecure temporary 
workers”, declaring they are very or quite likely to lose their jobs in the 
following year, “permanent-at-risk workers”, who are permanent workers 
stating that they are very or quite likely to lose their jobs and “permanent 
workers”, stating that they are not very likely to lose their jobs. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 and 6 about here] 
 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of the sample according to 
the scores for the degree of job satisfaction by type of worker showing a first 
perception into what matters for individual job satisfaction in terms of 
employment protection, as defined by the type of contract, or perceived 
safety regardless of the type of contract. In Figure 5 the workers are divided 
only according to their type of contract (permanent or temporary), while in 
Figure 6 workers are classified according to the categories mixing flexibility 
and security as discussed above. The first graph shows that it is not possible 
to indentify the impact of the type of contract alone on the perception of 
security in the workplace and its impact on the job security of workers. The 
second graph shows instead that, if we consider the four groups of workers 
defined by the combination of the type of contract and perceived job security, 
the distribution of satisfaction is similar, on the one hand, between flexicure 
secure temporary and permanent employment, on the other hand, between 
temporary workers and permanent at risk of insecurity. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
We therefore analyse whether workers who are heterogeneous in 
terms of both the type of labour contract and their perceived security do also 
differ with regard to life satisfaction and specific aspects of the job 
satisfaction. 
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5. Econometric strategy 
 
Satisfaction variables, given the ordinal nature of the dependent 
variable, are usually analysed using Ordered Probit models. 
In the realm of non-linear models with panel data, Wooldridge (2010) 
estimates the model parameters by a random effect ordered probit with the 
components modelled à la Mundlak, through a linear combination of 
regressors in group means. De Graaf Zijl (2012) uses instead a variant by 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijter (2004) of the fixed effect ordered logit 
minimum distance estimator by Das and Van Soest (1999). Hovewer, as 
discuseed by Bruno, Caroleo and Dessy (2013), all such estimators are 
computationally expensive, the first involving evaluation of multiple 
integrals and the last two requiring multiple estimation steps. Moreover, 
Baetschmann et al. (2011) proved that the various ways through which the 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijter (2004) method has been implemented leads to 
inconsistent estimators. 
 Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2006) developed also a procedure, 
called Probit OLS or POLS, that consists in transforming an ordinal 
dependent variable in a “pseudo” continuous one, and allows the application 
of a linear model. In their work, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell show 
that this linear method yields consistent outcomes with the traditional 
Ordered Probit. The POLS method replaces the original dependent variable 
by its conditional mean, which obeys the same trade-off relations as its 
underlying component, except for a proportionality factor (indeed, Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2006) show that ordered probit and POLS 
estimates are almost identical upto a proportionality coefficient). 
Consequently, as in our analysis, the POLS procedure is perfect for the 
examination of ordinal variables, as job satisfaction. The transformation of 
the ordinal dependent variable consists of deriving those Z-values of a 
standard normal distribution that correspond to the cumulated frequencies 
of the different categories of the ordinal dependent variable. 
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With longitudinal data, finally, the POLS method permits for the 
inclusion of individual level fixed or random effects, obtaining consistent 
estimates wih fixed effects. As soon as it must be considered that (RE) POLS 
has stricter requirements on correlated individual effects than FE POLS 
(Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004), our methodology therefore 
estimates a linear fixed effects model, thus controlling for unobserved time-
invariant characteristics. We also extend our analysis and seek to identify 
how insecurity affects temporary workers compared to permanent workers 
examining the impact of regional labour market conditions in the seven 
Swiss statistical regions2. 
The aim of the empirical analysis was therefore to study the 
determinants of perceived security, paying specific attention to the role of 
temporary contracts. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data, our preferred estimator is the 
FE POLS, whose estimates will be compared with those obtained with the 
common OLS linear model. 
To this end, we estimated the following model that can be expressed 
in this general form as: 
  
JSit = Fit +PRit +ITit + Xit + Wit + i + it        (1) 
 
In the baseline estimation, job satisfaction JSit of worker i  in year t is 
explained by the different contract types, where “Permanent and secure” 
employment acts as a reference category. Fit, PRit and ITit are, in this way, 
dummy variables that assume the value one when the worker is “Flexicure”, 
“Permament at Risk” and “Insecure temporary” and zero otherwise. The 
corresponding Betas measure the impact of different combinations of 
                                                          
2 For statistical purposes, Switzerland is subdivided into seven regions at the NUTS-2 level: 
Eastern Switzerland: Cantons of St. Gallen, Thurgau, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden, Glarus, Schaffhausen, Graubünden; Zürich: Canton of Zürich; Central 
Switzerland: Cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Lucerne, Zug; Northwestern 
Switzerland: Cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Aargau; Espace Mittelland: 
Cantons of Bern, Solothurn, Fribourg, Neuchatel, Jura; Région lémanique: Cantons of 
Geneva, Vaud, Valais; Ticino: Canton of Ticino. 
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contract tipologies and perceived security. The individual-specific fixed 
effect i is assumed to capture unobserved time-invariant factors as ability, 
optimism, motivation, or social background, as well as the baseline 
satisfaction level. The fixed-effects estimator permits the regressors to be 
correlated with the time-invariant components of the error i, but assumes 
that they are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error it, for which the 
usual properties are assumed. The baseline estimation displays the 
differences in job satisfaction of a worker in different contractual 
arrangements. 
However, since in the baseline specification we do not control for 
(time variant) differences in personal, firm or job characteristics, the 
difference in job satisfaction may still be influenced also by these factors. As 
a consequence, we implement three different specifications starting with the 
most parsimonious one (Model 1), then we add a set of controls for observed 
personal and firm characteristics (gender, age, language, education, job 
sector, working intensity), described by the vector Xit, (Model 2). In the last 
specification (Model 3), we include variables that might be proxies for 
different job-related characteristics, exploiting the richness of the data set 
and including also a large set of variables on workers’ psychological 
attitudes toward work and life (vector Wit). 
We estimated the three models for the whole sample. The last (Model 
3) was our preferred specification, and we used it to obtain the relevant 
estimates by gender, age and education. 
 
6. Results 
 
Results show that job stability and perceived security are not 
necessarily associated, and that job satisfaction is relatively low, mainly 
when perceived job security is low. The relationship between wellbeing and 
job security also varies according to employment and personal conditions.  
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In order to highlight the role of unobserved heterogeneity, Table 6 
compare OLS and Fixed effects POLS estimates of the most parsimonious 
model (Model 1) for both on Job and Overall Satisfaction. 
  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Our results show that the job satisfaction of flexicure workers is 
greater than those of permanent workers (not statistically significative for 
overall satisfaction), and by contrast, compared to the latter, the job 
satisfaction of insecure temporary workers and those on permanent 
contracts at risk of unemployment is much lower. 
Table 7 reports the relevant results from the estimation of Model 1, 
Model 2 and Model 3 by FE POLS. Estimates with the richest specification 
show that no statistically significant differences in job satisfaction emerge 
between permanent and flexicure workers (Model 3) and, by contrast, 
compared to the first, the job satisfaction of insecure temporary workers and 
those on permanent contracts at risk of unemployment is much lower. These 
results are rather robust to model specification, the only exception being 
that in Model 1 and Model 2 the difference in job satisfaction for flexicure 
workers is positive and statistically significative. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Comparing our results with previous studies on the subject our job 
stability estimate is consistent with the evidence for Germay (Jahn, 2013) 
and (Beckmann, Binz, and Schauenberg, 2007), Italy (Bruno, Caroleo and 
Dessy, 2013) and Australia (Wooden et al., 2004; Green and Leeves, 2013).  
This is also in line with the findings of Origo and Pagani (2009) for the 
general European context, where job stability has been found strongly 
linked to workers’ well-being.  
To the contrary, De Graaf-Zijl (2008) finds that satisfaction with job 
content is one of the main job domains influencing job satisfaction in the 
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Netherlands and that this is independent of the worker’s contract type. One 
possible explanation for the differences in the results might indeed be 
explained by the effective flexicurity policies implemented in the 
Netherlands and by the fact that we observe workers’ psychological 
attitudes toward work and other important dimensions of job satisfaction 
that instead are not observed in the Dutch data. 
 
6.1 Estimates by groups 
In order to explore the existence of heterogeneous effects of the 
combination of flexibility and security on job satisfaction, Table 8 reports 
complete POLS estimates of Model 3 by gender, age and education. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Our main results discussed above hold for males, while in the case of 
females we do not find statistically significant differences in job satisfaction 
for both groups of temporary workers, while permanent at risk workers are 
still statistically significant dissatisfied with their job compared with 
“permanent and secure” workers. 
Dissatisfaction with working stress has been proven to be an 
important aspect of job satisfaction (Green et al. 2010); this also holds for 
Swiss workers and particularly for female workers that appear unhappier 
with reported stress than men.  
Considering age heterogeneity, it can be noted that, if job satisfaction 
of the permanent contracts at risk of unemployment is significant for all the 
three age levels, young workers mainly drive the difference in job 
satisfaction for insecure temporary workers. Job stability is indeed the 
aspect with the highest negative, and significant, incidence on the job 
satisfaction of young workers, as proven by (Bruno, Caroleo and Dessy, 
2013). 
Estimates by education highlight that, after controlling for personal, 
firm and job characteristics, compared with “permanent and secure 
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workers” job satisfaction of “permanent at risk” workers is lower (and the 
difference is statistically significant) for workers with a higher education 
and the coefficient becomes much larger than that in Table 7 for the whole 
sample. This indicates that different job characteristics should compensate 
these workers for a presumably adverse contract type. 
 
6.2 Other controls 
Moreover, our estimates show that receiving help from the family 
partner increases the level of job satisfaction. This holds only for workers 
with an intermediate education while insecure temporary workers with a 
higher education are as satisfied with their jobs as their permanent 
counterparts. This could be due to the so called “FTC effect” (Beckmann et 
al., 2007) that expects that workers in multitasking jobs, even with a fixed-
term contract, are more satisfied. 
Turning first to men, results show that they are more satisfied if they 
receive help in the family life. The pattern for women is quite different, 
where this coefficient is not significant and interestingly seems that having 
children (in a couple) affect women’s job satisfaction, while it seems to be a 
weak job characteristic for all men. 
The effect of the political tendency is contradictory, being conflicting 
for young and older workers. If job satisfaction of young workers is 
negatively affected by a right tendency, the opposite holds for older workers. 
Finally, as soon as regional effects are identified by movers across 
regions, but transition frequencies are extremely low in our data, 
coefficients on regional dummies are generally insignificant. 
Nevertheless, insecure workers in “poor” regions (regions with a 
higher unemployment rate or worse economic characteristics) have a 
relatively lesser job satisfaction compared to workers in “wealthy” regions 
(those with lower unemployment rates). These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis as insecure workers in “poor performing” regions should be 
relatively more concerned about their employment opportunities. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have analysed the determinants of perceived job 
satisfaction, a summary measure reflecting how workers value various job 
characteristics, in Switzerland, paying specific attention to the role of 
temporary contracts. More specifically, we have empirically tested whether 
the negative effect of holding a temporary contract on a subjective measure 
of job satisfaction is influenced by workers characteristichs (such as gender, 
age and education). We split workers into four groups according to the 
flexibility/security mix characterising their employment relationship and we 
analysed the impact of this mix on overall job satisfaction. Using individual 
data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), we have shown that it is not 
the formal security as defined by the contract type or the working conditions 
alone that matter for job satisfaction but the subjectively perceived job 
security. Overall, also after controlling for endogeneity, our results show 
that the job satisfaction of insecure temporary workers and that of 
permanent-at-risk workers is much lower from that of permanent workers. 
We estimated different specifications of a linear POLS model, starting 
from a parsimonious specification (controlling only for contract types and 
excluding personal characteristics) and progressively adding controls for job 
characteristics (as stress and working conditions), ending with a full 
specification including all the job-related variables that should produce 
effects on job satisfaction (as firm sector, occupation and tenure) or controls 
on psychological characteristics and attitudes towards work and life. Job 
stability and perceived security are valued in different ways and the lack of 
job security is a primary source of job dissatisfaction. 
No significant differences emerge on the estimated effect by gender, 
while some heterogeneity is evident by age and education. 
Our results indicate that the duration of the contract may be less 
important if the worker perceives that he is not at risk of unemployment. In 
this regard, from a point of view of policy, a greater “flexicurity” can be 
obtained either directly from employer, adopting changes in work 
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organization, or indirectly by policy makers through an appropriate 
mix of active labour market policies. The adoption of a proper mix of 
flexibility and security would also be crucial as its subsequent effects 
on perceived security. Labour turnover should in fact be higher, but 
more efficient, in the so-called “flexicure” countries, where perceived 
security is likely to be less influenced by the current recession. 
Perceived security should be instead particularly carefully 
monitored in the countries where in the past, even during recovery 
years, labour turnover has been low and highly inefficient owing to 
the high levels of job insecurity prevailing also among permanent 
workers. With respect to the “pure flexibility” policy adopted to date 
by many economies Europe, the “flexicurity” approach may therefore 
be an alternative.  
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Figure 2 - Protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals, 
2013*. 
*Data refer to 2013 for OECD countries and Latvia, 2012 for other countries. The figure 
presents the contribution of employment protection for regular workers against individual 
dismissal (EPR) and additional provisions for collective dismissal (EPRC) to the indicator of 
employment protection for regular workers against individual and collective dismissal 
(EPRC). The height of the bar represents the value of the EPRC indicator. 
 
Source: OECD Employment Protection Database, 2013 update. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Regulation on temporary contracts, 2013*.  
* Data refer to 2013 for OECD countries and Latvia, 2012 for other countries. The figure 
presents the contribution of the indicator of regulation for standard fixed-term contracts 
(EPFTC) and the indicator of regulation for TWA employment (EPTWA) to the indicator of 
regulation on temporary contracts (EPT). The height of the bar represents the value of the 
EPT indicator. 
 
Source: OECD Employment Protection Database, 2013 update. 
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Figure 4 - Distribution of job satisfaction in Switzerland, by year. 
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Figure 5 - Job satisfaction by types of workers (“Permanent”, “Temporary”). 
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Figure 6 - Job satisfaction by types of workers (“Permanent at Risk”, “Insecure temporary”, 
“Flexicure”, “Permanent and secure”).  
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Table 4 - Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Types 
permanent 
1 if permanent worker not very/not at all likely to lose 
job in the following year 0.7055521 0.4558025
instemp 
1 if seasonal, temporary or casual job and employees 
under contract or for fixed time period, very/quite likely 
to lose job in the following year 0.036806 0.1882886
flexicure 
1 if seasonal, temporary or casual job and employees 
under contract or for fixed time period, not very/not at 
all likely to lose job in the following year 0.1015376 0.3020447
perrisk 
1 if permanent worker very/quite likely to lose job in the 
following year 0.1561044 0.3629609
Individual and local 
characteristics 
age Age (continuous) 39.98767 22.07502
age2 Squared age (continuous) 2086.314 1847.392
female 1 if female 0.5149582 0.4997794
married 1 if married 0.4630372 0.4986351
children 1 if not-married couple with children 0.0126515 0.111766
marchildren 1 if married couple with children 0.504654 0.4999816
famhelp 1 if receives help form partner 0.7742639 0.418073
young 1 if age<31 0.3603915 0.4801171
middleaged 1 if age>31 & age<50 0.2921895 0.4547719
older 1 if age>50 0.3474191 0.4761533
lang1 1 if language French 0.2576662 0.437352
lang2 1 if language German 0.6978513 0.4591923
lang3 1 if language Italian 0.0444825 0.2061659
eduinf 1 if primary educaton 0.2961684 0.4565694
edumid 1 if apprenticeship, full-time vocational school 0.5195185 0.4996223
edusup 1 if high school, university 0.1843131 0.387742
small_town 1 if lives in small or middle sized town 0.0798875 0.2711206
large_town 1 if lives in large town 0.1914589 0.3934519
Employment 
characteristics 
lowinc 1 if low income 0.3683553 0.4823662
midinc 1 if medium income 0.1984487 0.3988379
highinc 1 if high income 0.3666592 0.4819001
professional 1 if professionals 0.1661706 0.3722393
hightech 1 if higher supervisory/technicians 0.2380938 0.4259233
desk 1 if intermediate occupations 0.1969384 0.3976914
self 1 if self employed 0.0693415 0.2540378
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
        
lowtech 1 if lower supervisors and technicians 0.0223545 0.1478359
routine 1 if routine job 0.0916353 0.2885148
lowhour 1 if low than 25 work hours/week 0.2434423 0.4291671
midhour 
1 if between 25 work hours/week and 42 work 
hours/week 0.3748516 0.4840923
highhour 1 if more than 42 work hours/week 0.2924402 0.4548912
nightwork 1 if night work 0.1246501 0.3303267
satwork 1 if work on Saturday 0.4809949 0.4996461
stresswork 1 if stressful job 0.3388675 0.4733318
lowint 1 if low intensity job 0.2406824 0.4275042
midint 1 if medium intensity job 0.5364157 0.4986796
highint 1 if high intensity job 0.2229019 0.4161993
Region of residence 
r1 1 if Lake Geneva (VD, VS, GE) 0.1772811 0.3819089
r2 1 if Middleland (BE, FR, SO, NE, JU) 0.2458528 0.4305945
r3 1 if North-west Switzerland (BS, BL, AG) 0.1404818 0.3474885
r4 1 if Zurich 0.1719964 0.3773798
r5 1 if East Switzerland (GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG) 0.1287267 0.3348993
r6 1 if Central Switzerland (LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, ZG) 0.0982947 0.2977147
r7 1 if Ticino 0.0373664 0.1896593
Political party 
left 1 if left 0.2412348 0.4278374
centre 1 if centre 0.559878 0.4964075
right 1 if right 0.1010383 0.301383
Job characteristics 
noga1 1 if Agriculture, hunting, forestry 0.0294874 0.1691711
noga2 1 if Fishing and fish farming 0.0002743 0.0165601
noga3 1 if Mining and quarrying 0.0005829 0.0241365
noga4 1 if  Manufacturing 0.1459626 0.3530748
noga5 1 if Electricity, gas and water supply 0.0068232 0.0823221
noga6 1 if Construction 0.0475227 0.2127577
noga7 
1 if Wholesale,retail; repair motor vehicles,household 
goods 0.1221327 0.3274446
noga8 1 if Hotels and restaurants 0.0271558 0.1625402
noga9 1 if Transport, storage and communication 0.0514315 0.22088
noga10 1 if Financial intermediation; insurance 0.0603463 0.2381314
noga11 1 if Real estate; renting; computer; research 0.1244985 0.3301551
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
    
noga12 
1 if Public admin,national defence; compulsory social 
security 0.065558 0.2475122
noga15 
1 if Other community, social and personal service 
activities 0.0662781 0.2487718
noga16 1 if Private households with employed persons 0.0009943 0.0315181
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Table 5 - Workers’ types 
 
types Freq. Percent Cum. 
        
InsTemp 1.003 3,68 3,68 
PerRisk 4.254 15.61 19.29 
Flexicure 2.767 10,15 29.44 
Permanent 19.227 70.56 100.00 
Total 27.251 100.00 
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Table 6 - Job (z) and Overall (y) Satisfaction - OLS  and Fixed effects POLS (Model 
1) 
 
  OLS OLS FE POLS FE POLS 
VARIABLES y z y Z 
Ref. group permanent workers     
          
instemp 
 
-0.273*** -0.287*** -0.075*** -0.113*** 
[0.029] [0.031] [0.028] [0.032] 
flexicure 0.118*** 0.074*** 0.028 0.136*** 
[0.018] [0.019] [0.022] [0.025] 
perrisk -0.313*** -0.391*** -0.081*** -0.183*** 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.016] 
     
     
     
Observations 26,466 26,450 26,466 26,450 
R-squared 0.022 0.026 0.002 0.009 
Number of idpers     7,368 7,366 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 - Job Satisfaction - Fixed effects POLS (Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES z z z 
Ref. group permanent workers 
        
instemp -0.113*** -0.144*** -0.169*** 
[0.032] [0.053] [0.059] 
flexicure 0.136*** 0.081* 0.007 
[0.025] [0.045] [0.049] 
perrisk -0.183*** -0.211*** -0.230*** 
[0.016] [0.023] [0.026] 
Other controls 
Individual and local characteristics NO YES YES 
Employment characteristics NO YES YES 
Region of residence NO NO YES 
Political party NO NO YES 
Job characteristics NO NO YES 
Observations 26,450 13,269 11,093 
R-squared 0.009 0.026 0.034 
Number of idpers 7,366 4,840 4,271 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 - Job Satisfaction overall and by gender, age, education - Fixed effects 
POLS (Model 3) 
  (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
VARIABLES z z z z z z z z z 
Ref. group permanent 
workers 
Overall females male young mid’aged older eduinf edumid edusup 
  
instemp -0.169*** -0.118 -0.238*** -0.337*** -0.033 -0.170 -0.189 -0.277*** 0.076 
[0.059] [0.080] [0.090] [0.114] [0.095] [0.132] [0.210] [0.078] [0.119] 
flexicure 0.007 -0.045 0.077 0.003 0.007 -0.090 -0.167 -0.048 0.086 
[0.049] [0.065] [0.076] [0.099] [0.077] [0.101] [0.198] [0.069] [0.088] 
perrisk -0.230*** -0.250*** -0.216*** -0.431*** -0.229*** -0.168*** -0.184 -0.219*** -0.248***
[0.026] [0.038] [0.035] [0.084] [0.034] [0.048] [0.119] [0.031] [0.053] 
age -0.071*** -0.066** -0.073** -0.126 -0.076 -0.166 -0.080 -0.060** -0.128***
[0.022] [0.032] [0.032] [0.152] [0.056] [0.147] [0.088] [0.029] [0.049] 
age2 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
married -0.016 -0.004 -0.030 0.089 -0.082 0.277 -0.703 0.015 -0.067 
[0.057] [0.085] [0.077] [0.131] [0.082] [0.223] [0.436] [0.079] [0.091] 
children 0.100 0.158 0.063 1.205** 0.015 - -0.245 0.191 -0.095 
[0.140] [0.244] [0.168] [0.569] [0.153] - [0.868] [0.193] [0.232] 
marchildren -0.092** -0.109** -0.075 -0.097 -0.036 -0.056 0.100 -0.074 -0.089 
[0.039] [0.056] [0.054] [0.095] [0.070] [0.065] [0.223] [0.051] [0.071] 
famhelp 0.074*** 0.024 0.129*** 0.069 0.038 0.159*** 0.088 0.090*** 0.027 
[0.025] [0.038] [0.034] [0.082] [0.034] [0.043] [0.108] [0.031] [0.049] 
young -0.091 -0.091 -0.103 - - - 0.103 0.092 -0.377***
[0.066] [0.094] [0.094] - - - [0.539] [0.092] [0.105] 
older 0.002 0.068 -0.066 - - - -0.285 0.031 0.028 
[0.048] [0.069] [0.067] - - - [0.227] [0.059] [0.096] 
lang1 0.092 0.193 0.000 -0.083 0.031 -0.085 - -0.118 0.323 
[0.182] [0.287] [0.233] [0.928] [0.253] [0.330] - [0.248] [0.293] 
lang3 0.134 0.193 0.025 0.371 -0.074 1.579* -0.735 -0.158 0.461 
[0.262] [0.443] [0.324] [0.895] [0.313] [0.850] [0.990] [0.319] [0.932] 
eduinf -0.044 0.065 -0.163 -0.057 0.065 -0.089 - - - 
[0.078] [0.103] [0.125] [0.131] [0.169] [0.181] - - - 
edusup 0.109* 0.141 0.082 -0.154 0.328*** 0.004 - - - 
[0.065] [0.089] [0.100] [0.138] [0.098] [0.171] - - - 
small_town -0.062 -0.030 -0.071 -0.038 -0.133 0.190 0.683* -0.144 -0.110 
[0.101] [0.134] [0.160] [0.221] [0.144] [0.277] [0.402] [0.143] [0.171] 
large_town -0.085 0.005 -0.185* -0.123 -0.078 0.049 0.146 -0.069 -0.193* 
[0.068] [0.097] [0.099] [0.140] [0.099] [0.181] [0.482] [0.095] [0.117] 
lowinc 0.107*** 0.120*** 0.070 0.066 0.155*** 0.086 0.349** 0.134*** 0.024 
[0.037] [0.045] [0.070] [0.091] [0.051] [0.079] [0.173] [0.047] [0.073] 
highinc -0.013 0.002 -0.020 0.177** -0.022 -0.122* 0.002 -0.007 -0.017 
[0.032] [0.049] [0.044] [0.088] [0.044] [0.064] [0.187] [0.041] [0.060] 
professional 0.194*** 0.250** 0.105 0.229 0.080 -0.028 0.928** 0.025 0.491*** 
[0.072] [0.114] [0.095] [0.165] [0.105] [0.179] [0.420] [0.096] [0.178] 
hightech 0.193*** 0.226** 0.123 0.321** 0.144 -0.064 0.549* 0.066 0.451*** 
[0.063] [0.097] [0.085] [0.154] [0.089] [0.155] [0.313] [0.078] [0.171] 
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  (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
VARIABLES z z z z z z z z z 
Ref. group permanent 
workers 
Overall females male young middleaged older eduinf edumid edusup
          
desk 0.176** 0.168* 0.154 0.263* 0.134 -0.011 0.925** 0.114 0.285 
[0.069] [0.098] [0.102] [0.150] [0.098] [0.176] [0.393] [0.083] [0.181] 
lowtech -0.004 -0.006 -0.012 0.086 -0.048 0.217 0.179 -0.057 0.065 
[0.092] [0.159] [0.110] [0.339] [0.106] [0.242] [0.330] [0.109] [0.241] 
lowhour -0.059* -0.082* 0.037 -0.199* -0.092* 0.045 -0.065 -0.057 -0.002 
[0.035] [0.042] [0.070] [0.106] [0.048] [0.067] [0.160] [0.046] [0.062] 
highhour 0.014 0.021 0.013 0.034 0.019 -0.008 0.225* 0.004 0.046 
[0.026] [0.049] [0.030] [0.069] [0.036] [0.049] [0.123] [0.033] [0.048] 
nightwork -0.032 0.002 -0.050 0.072 -0.060 -0.051 0.145 -0.024 -0.093 
[0.038] [0.068] [0.046] [0.110] [0.050] [0.078] [0.163] [0.049] [0.075] 
satwork -0.015 0.010 -0.033 -0.021 -0.018 0.038 0.047 -0.018 0.024 
[0.024] [0.037] [0.032] [0.073] [0.031] [0.048] [0.112] [0.032] [0.042] 
stresswork -0.134*** 
-
0.162*** 
-
0.112***
-
0.190*** -0.134*** -0.089** 
-
0.282** 
-
0.138*** -0.095**
[0.023] [0.034] [0.030] [0.064] [0.030] [0.043] [0.113] [0.029] [0.040] 
lowint 0.040 0.060 0.023 0.052 0.085** -0.048 0.296** 0.025 0.042 
[0.026] [0.038] [0.036] [0.083] [0.036] [0.045] [0.117] [0.032] [0.051] 
highint -0.038 -0.040 -0.033 -0.180** -0.003 -0.036 -0.182 -0.041 -0.010 
[0.025] [0.036] [0.033] [0.076] [0.032] [0.048] [0.122] [0.031] [0.046] 
r1 -0.069 0.453 -0.602 1.180* -1.443** - - 0.386 -0.218 
[0.349] [0.479] [0.533] [0.613] [0.661] - - [0.727] [0.437] 
r2 -0.136 0.187 -0.651 0.437 -0.800** -0.349 - -0.231 -0.217 
[0.231] [0.292] [0.441] [0.455] [0.381] [0.896] - [0.467] [0.295] 
r3 0.171 0.407* -0.133 0.405 -0.205 0.035 - 0.009 0.080 
[0.173] [0.245] [0.261] [0.337] [0.290] [0.583] - [0.297] [0.249] 
r5 0.579*** 0.851*** 0.337 0.845** -0.289 0.985* - 0.332 0.201 
[0.203] [0.284] [0.299] [0.331] [0.344] [0.538] - [0.364] [0.297] 
r6 0.240 0.428 0.064 0.626 -0.164 - - 0.268 0.028 
[0.232] [0.359] [0.305] [0.643] [0.280] - - [0.416] [0.305] 
r7 0.832 0.377 1.078 - 0.412 - - 0.647 - 
[0.536] [0.811] [0.713] - [0.579] - - [0.585] - 
left -0.023 0.011 -0.065 0.193** -0.085** -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.040 
[0.031] [0.042] [0.044] [0.091] [0.041] [0.057] [0.131] [0.039] [0.056] 
right 0.046 0.049 0.057 -0.281** 0.028 0.235*** 0.304** 0.003 0.171 
[0.044] [0.074] [0.053] [0.120] [0.063] [0.076] [0.154] [0.052] [0.109] 
noga1 0.060 0.266 -0.188 -0.497 0.358 -0.042 -1.676 0.121 0.443 
[0.166] [0.250] [0.223] [0.394] [0.219] [0.366] [1.017] [0.184] [0.455] 
noga2 0.899 - 0.792 - - - - 0.897 
[0.909] - [0.868] - - - - [0.908] 
noga3 1.275* - 1.175* - 1.227* - 1.734** - - 
[0.720] - [0.687] - [0.720] - [0.837] - - 
noga5 0.144 0.138 0.140 - 0.328 0.394 - 0.224 -0.024 
[0.237] [0.585] [0.251] - [0.336] [0.383] - [0.386] [0.314] 
noga6 0.251** 0.726*** 0.141 0.252 0.202 0.961*** 0.703* 0.174 0.047 
[0.113] [0.251] [0.125] [0.234] [0.163] [0.285] [0.388] [0.141] [0.311] 
noga7 -0.091 -0.094 -0.087 0.021 -0.098 -0.220 -0.118 -0.007 0.050 
[0.063] [0.090] [0.092] [0.155] [0.086] [0.166] [0.250] [0.078] [0.165] 
noga8 -0.045 -0.092 0.050 -0.158 0.093 0.243 -0.172 0.103 0.643**
[0.114] [0.160] [0.167] [0.260] [0.157] [0.289] [0.365] [0.152] [0.293] 
Job satisfaction, flexibility and security: evidence from Swiss individual-level data 
77 
 
  (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
VARIABLES z z z z z z z z z 
Ref. group permanent 
workers 
Overall females male young mid’aged older eduinf edumid edusup 
          
noga9 -0.212** -0.262* -0.200* -0.457* -0.087 0.022 -0.223 -0.093 
-
0.528***
[0.088] [0.148] [0.111] [0.242] [0.112] [0.226] [0.523] [0.107] [0.195] 
noga10 -0.115 -0.384** 0.073 -0.159 -0.057 0.293 -0.007 0.004 0.076 
[0.105] [0.162] [0.138] [0.242] [0.140] [0.346] [1.157] [0.137] [0.193] 
noga11 -0.114* -0.185* -0.055 -0.212 -0.201** 0.355** -0.045 -0.011 -0.244**
[0.063] [0.098] [0.084] [0.174] [0.084] [0.138] [0.305] [0.089] [0.101] 
noga12 0.054 0.107 -0.001 0.059 0.086 0.382** 0.787 0.105 0.048 
[0.075] [0.110] [0.103] [0.284] [0.094] [0.185] [0.478] [0.109] [0.112] 
noga15 -0.101 -0.072 -0.147 -0.029 -0.184* -0.019 -0.089 -0.089 -0.164 
[0.072] [0.103] [0.104] [0.202] [0.105] [0.134] [0.301] [0.107] [0.112] 
noga16 0.509 - 0.569 0.701 - 0.257 - 1.178* 0.126 
[0.431] [0.413] [0.568] - [0.877] - [0.641] [0.580] 
Observations 11,093 5,690 5,403 2,081 6,143 2,869 932 7,118 3,043 
R-squared 0.034 0.041 0.040 0.118 0.040 0.056 0.180 0.032 0.052 
Number of idpers 4,271 2,213 2,058 1,146 2,326 1,152 556 2,794 1,145 
Standard errors in 
brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Abstract 
 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs), which are primarily addressed 
to integrate (or reintegrate) into the labour market those who are on the edge 
of unemployment, are generally analysed in the context of a macroeconomic 
approach or within a micro-econometric model. A critique of the usual eco-
nomic analysis of labour markets states, however, that a standard economic 
approach does not take into account the importance of the social environment 
in the demand-supply matching process. 
In order to address this problem Agent-based Computational Econom-
ics (ACE) can present both a generic model in order to explain a complex phe-
nomenon at a very abstract level and can be based on empirical data to de-
scribe a particular case study. The purpose of this paper, applying ACE mod-
els approach, is therefore to link micro-level and macro-level evaluations with 
an integrated (micro/macro) simulation model, trying to further diversify the 
battery of instruments used for ALMPs evaluation. 
The implemented ACE model defines a virtual regional labour market 
with firms and worker agents. Firms are assigned different sectors and have 
sector-specific skill requirements. The policy maker agent defines active la-
bour market policies, thus financing the unemployed workers’ human capital 
investment. During the simulation periods each firm opens vacant positions 
and receives applications; it then randomly chooses one applicant which fits 
with the firm’s skill requirements. Firms are also hit by shocks and dismiss 
their employees that are “too costly” (the worker’s “cost” depending on two 
factors, his productivity and his nationality). Unemployed workers have to 
invest in their human capital to qualify for vacancies opened in different sec-
tors. The model has been structured in modules (taking in consideration sub-
sidized training and job displacement effects), which allow the user to enable 
or disable some features while exploring different policy options. Following 
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the exposed perspective, we have developed a case study to test and validate 
the application of the proposed model and framework, exploring the regional 
labour market in southern Switzerland (Ticino and some districts of the Gri-
sons), where the particular geographical position of the Italian-speaking part 
of Switzerland was an incentive to build strong relationships between the 
cantons and the neighbouring Italian provinces. The model describes an en-
vironment where individual agents, their micro-level decisions and the macro 
level policies interact in a systemic way. 
Specifically, this study seeks to identify traceable connections between 
micro and macroeconomic scales exploring the regional labour market. At this 
point, the model is still experimental and calibration is very preliminary but 
it already allows to approximate quite a number of stylized features of this 
regional labour market. The model is programmed into NetLogo, a program 
specifically designed to accommodate agent-based modelling. 
 
JEL codes: C63; J61; J68 
 
Keywords: Labor market policy evaluation; Agent-based computational model 
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1. Introduction 
 
Labour policies include measures that, in addition to acting directly on 
the labour market, may also refer to individuals. They aim at facilitating the 
matching of supply and demand and at improving the access to employment 
for the disadvantaged. 
In this sense, a first definition (Salesi, Piras and Poggiu (eds.), 2004) 
can describe labour market policies as public interventions in the labour mar-
ket addressed to reach its efficient functioning and to correct imbalances. A 
simple classification can divide labour policies into two broad categories: 
a) passive policies, implemented to alleviate the discomfort created by 
unemployment (unemployment benefits, early retirement, etc.); 
b) active policies, defined to directly affect the employment opportuni-
ties of individuals. 
In this case they can deal with interventions for the employees (public 
employment services, guidance, support for job search) or firms (public sector 
job creation, incentives to hiring, training subsidies). 
However, active policies are primarily aimed at integrating (or reinte-
grating) into the labour market those who are on the edge of unemployment. 
The long-term objective, consistent with the previous definition of active pol-
icy, is to pursue the most efficient functioning of the labour market, reducing 
the long-term unemployment. 
For many years, this issue and the process through which firms and 
workers meet in the labour market has been extensively studied and the 
matching process that affects employment and unemployed dynamics has 
been a central research topic in labour economics. Most of the literature has 
tried to explain these phenomena on the grounds of a standard “toolbox” 
based on micro-foundations, which postulate hyper-rational firms and work-
ers: the “representative individual hypothesis” is often employed to overcome 
difficulties entailed by aggregation of heterogeneous agents. Moreover, static 
equilibrium conditions are largely used to interpret macroeconomic dynamics 
(Fagiolo, Dosi, and Gabriele, 2004). 
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Following this approach Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) are 
generally analysed in the context of a macroeconomic approach or within a 
micro-econometric model. The latter is used among many authors (Kluve, 
2010). This study, using a meta-analysis, based on a data set that includes 
137 programs from 19 countries, shows that it is almost exclusively the pro-
gram type that seems to influence the effectiveness of the program. 
A critique of the usual economic analysis of labour markets states, how-
ever, that a standard economic approach does not take into account the im-
portance of “social networks” in the labour process. Recent research, indeed, 
based on empirical findings (Pellizzari, 2011; Rebien, 2010; Dawid and Gem-
kov, 2013), highlights that social contacts like friends or relatives, organized 
in different types of networks (according to the average number of fiends/rel-
atives and the density of the network) have a substantial impact on the 
matching process. This view holds that relationships are fundamental to both 
employers and workers, since they are more likely to apply for jobs where 
they have a personal connection, and are more likely to be hired if they have 
“soft” skills. 
Moreover, workers (and jobs) are different and require different abili-
ties. As highlighted in the analysis of search policy started by McCall (1970), 
only in the simplest job search model the searcher is assumed to know both 
the distribution of wages for his particular skills and the cost of generating a 
job offer and job offers are consequently independent random selections from 
the distribution of wages. These offers occur periodically and are either ac-
cepted or rejected. Under these conditions the optimal policy for the job 
searcher is to reject all offers below a single critical number and to accept any 
offer above this critical number. However, a searcher in the labour market is 
clearly concerned not only with the hourly, weekly, or annual wage rate, but 
also with the anticipated period of employment. If other things are equal, the 
longer the period of employment, the more favourable the job opportunity is. 
The job searcher frequently possesses inadequate knowledge about the distri-
bution of wages appropriate to his skills. In this circumstance, it is important 
that he revises his estimate of the wage distribution as offers are made. If his 
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initial estimate is high, an adaptive policy reduces the period of frictional un-
employment, and, conversely if his initial estimate is low. In order to solve 
this issue an adaptive search policy has to be applied: in addition to saving 
computational time, automated contracting through computational agents 
can increase search efficiency in certain problem applications. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to further diversify the battery 
of instruments used for these assessments, focusing on an analysis at the re-
gional level. We propose a different interpretative strategy based on the 
acknowledgement that both firms and workers live in a complex system which 
evolves through time and might be characterized by endogenous, persistent, 
different agents, that are heterogeneous in their endowments, wealth, behav-
iour and rationality (Fagiolo, Dosi, and Gabriele, 2004). 
Starting from this context, agent-based computational economics 
(ACE) models (Testfasion, 1998) identify a generic model in order to explain 
a complex phenomenon at a very abstract level. At the same time, this kind 
of model can be based on empirical data to describe a particular case study. 
Finally, ACE models include spatial characteristics. A person located in an 
area with low labour demand will have a lower probability of get an employ-
ment. This fact is seldom covered in standard economic approaches (Dibble, 
2006).  
 This paper follows therefore an agent-based models (ABMs) approach 
trying to link micro-level and macro-level evaluations and focusing on the in-
teractions between economic agents. The so constructed model will actually 
try to describe the dynamic matching between labour supply and demand and 
how it is affected by specific changes in policy and social parameters. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by describing 
the convenience of evaluating Labour Market Policies with ACE. In Section 
3, we present the model and we discuss its characteristics, design concepts 
and functional specifications, according to Dahlem ABM documentation (Wolf 
et. al., 2010). We next present, in section 4, two test-experiments and first 
results. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions and perspectives. 
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2. Policy evaluation with ACE 
 
Recently, agent-based models have been proposed in order to support 
labour policy makers in their decisions: a similar argument holds for many 
policy questions, which are typically related to at least some aspects of econ-
omy, technology, and actor behaviour (Chappin, Chmieliauskas and de Vries, 
2012). With agents in a computer, it becomes possible to recreate actual world 
on an artificial basis, to see the effects of the action and interaction. As Wie-
ner, the actual founder of cybernetics, said1: 
“A material model is the representation of a complex system by a sys-
tem which is assumed simpler and which is also assumed to have some prop-
erties similar to those selected for study in the original complex system. A 
formal model is a symbolic assertion in logical terms of an idealized relatively 
simple situation sharing the structural properties of the original factual sys-
tem. Material models are useful in the following cases. a) They may assist the 
scientist in replacing a phenomenon in an unfamiliar field by one in a field in 
which he is more at home. (. . . ) b) A material model may enable the carrying 
out of experiments under more favourable conditions than would be available 
in the original system”. 
Substituting to the “material model” idea (the actual artefact) an 
agent-based model (the synthetic artefact), we can have the capacity of mak-
ing “experiments under more favourable conditions than would be available 
in the original system”. 
In social science, indeed, models are generally built in two ways, as a 
verbal argumentation or as mathematical equations, typically with statistics 
and econometrics. The first way is absolutely flexible and adaptable, but mere 
descriptions and discussion, by their nature, preclude tests and verifications 
of hypotheses. In contrast, the second way allows for computations and veri-
                                                            
1 Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N.: The Role of Models in Science, in “Philosophy of Science”, vol. 
12, 1945, n. 4, pp. 316-321 (1945), cited in (Terna, 2013). 
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fications, but suffers from severe limitations in flexibility and adaptation, es-
pecially with respect to how agents are expected to operate in the model and 
when accounting for their heterogeneity and interactions (Terna, 2013). 
Computer simulation can be considered as a “third way” that can com-
bine an extreme flexibility of a computer code where it is possible to create 
agents who act, make choices, and react to the choices of other agents and to 
modification of their environment and its computational power. This ap-
proach allows researchers to use the descriptive capabilities of verbal argu-
mentation and the ability to calculate the effects of different situations and 
hypotheses together. 
However, the application of agent-based models (ABMs) for policy eval-
uation is still limited: usually policy makers are presented with model out-
comes, which depend strongly on the choice of scenarios and many other as-
sumptions, and typically do not have access to the models themselves, as it 
takes technical expertise to run and interpret them. ABMs may actually be 
unwanted to policy makers, as they might confront them with the fact that 
for many of their objectives, they have limited control options. On the other 
hand, if ABMs are built with sufficient richness and organisation to be appli-
cable to real policy questions, simulation can act as a sort of magnifier that 
may be used to understand reality in a better way.  
Moreover, these new approaches are challenging, because new model-
ling techniques such as ABMs are not established in the way that traditional 
ones are (Lejour et al., 2006). It is not possible, indeed, to assess the macroe-
conomic consequences of labour market policies using a pure micro-approach; 
in the same way a macro-approach does not permit to look at an individual 
level, making impossible to evaluate the impact of ALMPs on a precise target 
group. Agent-based labour market models allow the extraction of information 
based on aggregate outcomes, that are fully explained by the characteristics 
of the agents and the systemic structure of their actions. 
Since these type of models simulate a complete set of individual obser-
vations they are also useful in addition to the micro-econometric evaluation 
approach ex post. A final advantage is that the simulation at the individual 
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level can help to formulate hypotheses on the micro-economic agent’s behav-
iour using simple and intuitive rules, closer to the reality than the abstraction 
of rational aggregate models. This greater attention to micro-economic behav-
iour characterizes the current ACE research. 
 
3. The model 
 
Following Dahlem ABM documentation guidelines (Wolf et al., 2010), 
the features of the model are structured as follows.  
 
a. Overview 
The proposed approach has been implemented with an integrated (mi-
cro/macro) simulation model. The model has been structured in modules (un-
til now, two modules were implemented: subsidized training and job displace-
ment effects), which let the user enable or disable some features to explore 
different policy options. Following the exposed perspective, we have devel-
oped a case study to test and validate the application of the proposed meth-
odology and framework. 
The implemented ACE model considers a virtual regional labour mar-
ket with firms and worker agents. Firms are assigned different sectors and 
have sector-specific skill requirements. 
Let’s consider a virtual word populated by a number nWork of worker 
agents. Each worker has assigned a nationality (Swiss or foreigner), an initial 
random skill Si and an initial productivity Pi. 
There are nSect sectors in the virtual word and nFirm number of firms. 
The number nSect has to be <= nFirm. As in (Neugart 2009) each firm has 
different skill requirements. Each firm is also assigned a random number of 
available vacancies. The policy maker agent defines active labour market pol-
icies. 
During the simulation periods firms are hit by shocks and dismiss their 
employees that are “too costly”. The worker’s “cost” depends on his productiv-
ity and his nationality (wage inequality, as described in Browne and Misra, 
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2003). Unemployed workers have to invest in their human capital to qualify 
for vacancies opened in different sectors. The policy maker finances the un-
employed workers’ human capital investment. 
At present the model doesn’t consider an explicit relationship structure 
between agents, but, depending on their “upgrading decision” on vacancies, 
that in turn depends on firm’s and agent’s decision, an implicit relationship 
holds. 
The model deals with the complex issue of aggregated phenomena in 
the regional labour market, characterized by an environment where individ-
ual agents (firms and worker agents), their decisions at the micro-level and 
the policies defined at a macro level interact in a systemic way. 
We are therefore addressing some subjects like connecting the eco-
nomic and cellular spatial simulation models, and connecting the conven-
tional econometric model to the developed integrated model. Specifically, this 
study seeks to identify traceable connections between micro and macroeco-
nomic scales exploring the regional labour market in southern Switzerland 
(Ticino and some districts of the Grisons), where the particular geographical 
position of the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland was an incentive to build 
strong relationships between the cantons and the neighbouring Italian prov-
inces. As an example one in four workers is a trans-border commuter.  
The benefits of this type of model are potentially many. The most obvi-
ous advantage is that it permits to simulate at an individual level the political 
impact of highly differentiated policies. This advantage has its counterpart in 
terms of results. Such a model that simulates a sample of individuals or firms 
can give messages on the evolution of a very large number of output variables, 
that were explicitly intended or not by the modeller: employment rates, un-
employment, labour turnover, length of stay in different states. 
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The model is programmed into NetLogo2, a program specifically de-
signed to accommodate agent-based modelling, which has a programming 
language which is flexible and easy to learn. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
b. Design Concepts 
When a simulation starts firms and workers are randomly allocated to 
sectors. If a firm is employing workers it checks if they are “too costly”; if so 
they are fired.  
Unemployed agents decide whether or not to apply for a skill upgrad-
ing. They choose to undergo a skill upgrading in the sector j only if the follow-
ing two conditions are satisfied: 
a) the vacancies in sector j are greater than a threshold; 
b) the cost of the human capital investment is less than a defined pay-
off, according to a particular investment strategy. 
The first condition limit tries to capture the “flexibility” constraint pur-
sued by modern labour market policies, the latter is a wealth constraint. 
The investment strategy is defined according to a learning model, 
which takes into account the job history of the worker, and measures the av-
erage payoffs the agent has gained in the previous periods if he was unem-
ployed.  
Each firm opens vacant positions and receives applications; it then ran-
domly chooses one applicant, who fits with the firm’s skills requirement (the 
hiring process probability depending on the history of the applicant and on a 
random parameter). The worker always accepts the first offer he gets.   
At present, the population level is considered stable, assuming that the 
simulation covers a short period of time, during which the workforce doesn’t 
significantly change. 
                                                            
2  http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. NetLogo is a multi-agent programmable modeling 
environment, authored by Uri Wilensky and developed at the Center for Connected Learning 
and Computer-Based Modeling at Northwestern University. 
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The level of randomness (considering the simple structure of the model) 
is anyway minimal, having the user the power to precisely tune most of the 
aspects of the simulation. 
 
c. Functional Specification 
In conjunction with firms and worker agents, that are the most im-
portant agents in the model, there are different variables that contribute to 
define the simulation environment. 
 
 Firms (Nfirm), that hire workers, assumed fixed in time and 
space; 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
  Worker agents (Nwork), that apply for jobs; 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
 Variables, that define the environment. 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
The model is initialized setting Nfirm and Nwork, and all the variables 
reported in Table 11; the model does not need external data. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 
The simulation then runs according to the following scheme (Pseudo-
code): 
 
Create firms and workers 
Create sectors 
Allocate randomly workers to sectors 
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Set initial conditions 
 
for n periods 
 
Dismissal 
For each sector 
For each worker 
If worker’s cost > threshold 
Dismissal 
 
Human capital investment 
For each unemployed 
If vacancy in sector i > threshold invest 
else if  calculate payoff 
choose investment strategy 
apply investment strategy 
  
Hiring 
For each sector 
For each firm 
If vacancy 
If worker apply 
Select worker 
Else 
Not fill vacancy 
 
End n period 
 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
 
4.  Experiments 
 
The usual validation procedure involves multiple monte-carlo simula-
tions and the analysis of the aggregate data (Lewkovicz, Z., Domingue, D. and 
Kant, J.-D. 2009). Using NetLogo the procedure is performed through the 
“Behaviour space” tool that allows the user to set up experiments with multi-
ple repetitions. 
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Moreover, BehaviorSearch3, a software tool implemented to help with 
automating the exploration of agent-based models, by using genetic algo-
rithms and other heuristic techniques to search the parameter-space, has 
been tested. 
BehaviorSearch provides a low-threshold way to search for combina-
tions of model parameter settings that will result in a specified target behav-
iour.  According to the BehaviorSearch documentation the model exploration 
follows four steps: 
 
 Designing a quantitative measure for the labour market out-
come or policy that policy maker is interested in; 
 Choosing parameters to vary and what ranges are allowed; 
 Choosing a search algorithm and running it; 
 Final examination of the results, studying what parameters 
most affect the initially defined labour market outcome or policy. 
 
By changing the model parameters, the user can therefore explore al-
ternative policy measures that might lead to different labour market out-
comes altering the economic efficiency of a given policy. For example, by as-
suming a 1 percent intensification for the “layoff” threshold, the policy maker 
con obtain a 0.58 point decrease in the unemployment rate, 2.63 in percentage 
less than the initial estimated rate. 
Finally, the versatility of the model allows the integration of any fur-
ther information gathered about the regional labour market or the imple-
mented form of each Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP). 
 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
 
                                                            
3  BehaviorSearch.org.  The  design  and  implementation  of  BehaviorSearch  was  one  aspect  of  Forrest 
Stonedahl's doctoral thesis research, with adviser Uri Wilensky, at the Center for Connected Learning and 
Computer‐Based Modeling at Northwestern University. 
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The setup of two test-experiments is described below. In the experi-
ments that follow, different run-periods of the algorithm described in the 
Functional Specification paragraph are selected. 
 
4.1 Subsidized training 
A first base test concerns the impact of an increased subsidized train-
ing: comparing a “base” and an “incremented” subsidy. 
The worker agents are divided in two groups, one of “base subsidized” 
and one of “incremented subsidized” workers; then the simulation is run. The 
employment rate is checked against the base condition. 
The user input values are set to: 
 
 NFirm [15] 
 NWork [50] 
 initial_wealth [10] 
 strict [0.99]  
 thrsprev [4 ] 
 memory-size [5] 
 number-strategies [10]  
 thrsflex2 [ 0.7] 
 thrsflex3 [0.5] 
 foreign [0] 
 
After 1000 steps, the tool provides an increase in the average final em-
ployment rate of 2 points.  
Assuming a higher initial wealth of 15 and a lower strict value of 0.98, 
the effect of the “incremented subsidy” disappears.  This implies that, accord-
ing to the model, subsides are not effective if the labour market is more flex-
ible and therefore policy makers should invest in different policies (i.e support 
for job search).  
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4.2  Job displacement effects 
A second experiment concerns the analysis of the treatment effects on 
the individual and the macro-economic level. ALMPs cause an increase in the 
size of the labour force and this involves more competition in the labour mar-
ket and could produce the opportunity for firms to dismiss “non subsidized” 
workers and to replace them with “subsidized” workers (Froy and Giguère, 
2010). The simulation assumes therefore that the subsidy “improves” the past 
history of the applicant, increasing his hiring probability. 
As before the worker agents are divided in two groups, one of treated 
and one of non-treated workers; the agents from the non-treated group do not 
receive subsidies. 
The experiment is divided in two phases. In a first simulation round no 
subsidies are given neither to the treated workers nor to the non-treated 
workers, then in a second round the agents that belong to the treated group 
are subsidized. 
Finally, the last differences between the employment rate of treated 
and non-treated agents for both round are compared. 
As in the previous experiment the user input values are set to: 
 
 NFirm [15] 
 NWork [50] 
 initial_wealth [10] 
 strict [0.99]  
 thrsprev [4 ] 
 memory-size [5] 
 number-strategies [10]  
 thrsflex2 [ 0.7] 
 thrsflex3 [0.5] 
 JobDisplaceSub [0] 
 foreign [0] 
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In this case, after 1000 steps, results shows a negligible difference in 
the average final employment, showing that the macro effects, as the total 
skill level of the applicant or his human capital level, exceed the signal effect 
of the subsidy on the workers’ history.  
 
5. Discussion and perspectives 
 
This agent-based model is intended as a first prototype of an agent-
based regional labour market model with sector specific requirements. 
We have highlighted a mechanism of the job search in a regional labour 
market characterized by a complex environment where firms, worker agents 
and policies interact in a systemic way.  
At this point, the model is still experimental and calibration is prelim-
inary (the initial conditions on nSect, nFirm, nationality, skills Si and produc-
tivity Pi are based on empirical data, coming from a regional labour market 
analysis), but it already allows to approximate quite a number of stylized fea-
tures of the southern Swiss regional labour market. 
Human capital accumulation within the model is effective on its own 
to account for many formalised facts. Indeed, the model implies that skill im-
provement is essential in facilitating the matching process; furthermore, the 
flexibility level is a key part of an efficient labour market. 
Moreover, the actual implementation of the model is effective in testing 
different scenarios useful in the evaluation of different policy setting. In fact, 
the tool permits to set model parameters on worker’s nationality, agent’s 
wealth, agent’s strategy, worker’s “learning constraint”, flexibility of the la-
bour market and differences between sectors. As an example, an improve-
ment of the sectorial flexibility of the labour market can significantly modify 
the employment rate. 
Finally, this paper proposes a general methodology, Agent-based Com-
putational Economics (ACE), aimed to identify and quantify the effects of dif-
ferent situations and hypotheses together. 
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 However, the approach of evaluating labour market policies with 
agent-based models entails strong assumptions and some issues. The model 
specification is a key factor that can involve difficulties and the calibration is 
still imperfect. In such models some issues such as empirical initialization, 
the limitations of data collection, empirical validation or the role of data in 
the design must be addressed.  This procedure should be considered as a start-
ing point and further improvements are strongly recommended. 
In the study of labour market gender, age, education and nationality 
(local-foreigners) inequalities are four of the most relevant issues to have in 
mind; we are aware that the inclusion of a greater heterogeneity of agents 
(gender, age, formal education) is a difficult issue as it affects the labour de-
mand function/decision rule in several ways. Anyway, introducing an empir-
ically-grounded agent-based modelling technique, it should be possible to ad-
dress some challenging issues in modelling of complex regional labour mar-
kets phenomena. 
 We finally consider enlarging the analysis to a wider geographical area 
in order to cover a greater labour market; the integration of a GIS module 
would make the policy maker self-confident with the geographical context. 
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Table 9 - Firm’s state variables 
Name Type Description Updating Initialization 
firm     
region patch  place where the firm is 
located  
fixed randomly assigned 
Nvacancy N = 1 + random 10 number of available 
vacancies 
volatile randomly assigned 
sector N = [1, 2, 3] firm’s Economic Sector  fixed randomly assigned 
Factory employed N <= Nvacancy employed number in 
the firm 
volatile computed 
 
 
Table 10 - Worker agent’s state variables 
Name Type Description Updating Initialization 
worker agent     
nationality N = [0, 1] worker's nationality (0 
Swiss, 1 foreign) 
fixed computed: 20% of them 
are foreign 
wealth N = {0, 100} agent’s wealth volatile user input 
subsidized? N = [0, 1] subsidized worker fixed user input 
skills_level S N = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] worker's skills level volatile randomly assigned 
productivity P N = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10] 
worker's productivity fixed randomly assigned 
worker? N = [0, 1] worker (true or false) volatile 0 
strategy N = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10] 
agent’s strategy volatile randomly assigned 
best strategy N = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10] 
best strategy volatile randomly assigned 
upgrade N = [0, 1] true if the agent 
currently plans to 
upgrade his/her skill 
level 
volatile 0 
prediction -1.0 < R > 1.0 current prediction of 
the skill upgrade 
volatile randomly assigned 
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Table 11 - Variables in the model 
Name Type Description Updating Initialization 
strict 0 <= R >= 1 “layoff” threshold fixed user input 
thrsprev N = {0, 50} "learning" constrain fixed user input 
memory-size N = {0, 10} agent’s memory size fixed user input 
number-strategies N = {0, 20} agent’s maximum 
number of strategies 
fixed user input 
thrsflex2 0 <= R >= 1 "flexibility" constrain 
secondary sector 
fixed user input 
thrsflex3 0 <= R >= 1 "flexibility" constrain 
tertiary sector 
fixed user input 
employment rate 0 <= R >= 1 employment rate volatile computed 
unemployment rate 0 <= R >= 1 unemployment rate volatile computed 
skills level N total skill level volatile computed 
foreign N = [0, 1] nationality 
discrimination 
fixed user input 
JobDisplaceSub N = [0, 1] increase subsidy 10% fixed user input 
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Figure 7 – Model interface 
 
Figure 8 – Model setup
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Figure 9 – Model running
 
Figure 10 - Experiments
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Conclusions 
 
Switzerland, which is a federal republic consisting of 26 regions 
(Cantons) has been characterised by considerable stability and consensus 
building. The legislative process is largely decentralised, with a strong role 
given to the Cantons and to elements of direct democracy. For this reason, 
there is regional variation in Switzerland, concerning financial capacity, 
employment patterns, unemployment levels and welfare dependency. 
The Swiss labour market is characterised by high employment rates, 
low unemployment and high wage levels: over the past three decades, the 
Swiss labour force has grown from about 3 million to 4.8 million people. The 
main factors underlying this good performance are normally considered to 
be a high degree of labour market flexibility, with decentralised wage 
bargaining and relatively low employment protection regulations, supported 
by a strong focus (at least since the mid-1990s) on active labour market 
policies and employment services characterised by strong “mutual-
obligation” principles. The high share of part time in total employment 
(26.0% in 2012, compared with an OECD average of 16.9%) and the share of 
temporary among total employment (13% in 2013, slightly above the OECD 
average, 12%) are bright results of this rules. Another feature of labour 
market performance has been the design of immigration policies, which in 
the past implied the use of immigrant labour as a labour supply reserve that 
left the country in times of economic hardship.  
However, Switzerland has not escaped the global economic downturn 
starting in 2008: the impact of the recession on the labour market, at first 
relatively modest, nevertheless led to a 30% rise in unemployment, from 
3.5% in 2008 to 4.4% in 2009, and only recently it has been starting going 
down (4.1% in 2013 - last quarter). 
The study of perceptions of economic insecurity in Switzerland, 
during the business cycle between 2008 and 2011, has been the subject of 
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the research in the first essay. The analysis contributes to depict 
perceptions of Swiss workers. A comprehensive dataset, the Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in 
the Social Sciences FORS, has been used. I show that perceptions are 
similar to those obtained from studies conducted in other European 
economies: perceptions of job security tend to be higher among workers with 
supervisory responsibilities, among permanent workers and among workers 
who live in regions that are not adversely affected by economic conditions. 
Moreover, perceived job security in non-public sector jobs is lower than in 
public sector jobs, which seem to be more generally perceived as safe jobs 
and protected from labour market shocks. 
Unlike previous studies, however, I found that perceptions do not 
strongly differ between workers with different levels of education and age is 
not positively correlated with confidence in keeping one’s current job. 
My results should help understanding the reasons that influence job 
insecurity: from a policy perspective, local authorities should increase their 
awareness that policy-specific information is processed with a bias; 
otherwise, policies may have unanticipated economic consequences. 
Moreover, this study contributes to the literature by revising 
important variables that help to explain the formation of job insecurity 
perceptions, emphasizing the need to critically question rationality 
assumptions in many economic models. My results seem to confirm, indeed, 
the necessity to use cardinal rather than ordinal scales. 
The research proposed in this thesis has followed a path from 
microeconomic to regional aspects of complexity, examining the link 
between job security, flexibility and job satisfaction. 
The second essay extends therefore the analysis studying the 
determinants of perceived job satisfaction, a summary measure reflecting 
how workers value various job characteristics, paying specific attention to 
the role of perceived security and temporary contracts. I split workers into 
four groups according to the flexibility/security mix characterising their 
employment relationship and I analysed the impact of this mix on overall 
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job satisfaction. Using the same dataset as in the first essay, I have shown 
that it is not the formal security as defined by the contract type or the 
working conditions alone that matter for job satisfaction but the subjectively 
perceived job security.  
My results indicate that the duration of the contract may be less 
important if the worker perceives that he is not at risk of unemployment: 
job stability and perceived security are nonetheless valued in different ways 
and the lack of job security is a primary source of job dissatisfaction. No 
significant differences emerge on the estimated effect by gender, while some 
heterogeneity is evident by age and education. 
The comparison with previous studies on the subject shows that my 
job stability estimates are consistent with the evidence for other developed 
economies, where job stability has been found strongly linked to workers’ 
well-being.  
 Form a policy perspective, the results presented in this dissertation 
prove that the adoption of a proper mix of flexibility and security has a 
crucial impact on perceived security. They should encourage both labour 
authorities and firms to shift toward a “flexicure” model, which implies a 
higher, but more efficient, labour turnover.  
Finally, the results presented in this thesis should encourage 
additional empirical research on the use of a linear fixed effects model (FE 
POLS) for the analysis of subjective economic variables. 
Last, the third paper highlights a mechanism of the job search in a 
regional labour market characterized by a complex environment where 
firms, worker agents and policies interact in a systemic way.  I have 
programmed and set up an agent-based model (ABM) of a regional labour 
market model with sector specific requirements. 
The model is still experimental but allows to approximate quite a 
number of stylized features of the southern Swiss regional labour market. 
The tool allows the user to set model parameters on workers’ 
characteristics, on the flexibility of the labour market and on differences 
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between sectors and it is effective in testing different scenarios useful in the 
evaluation of different policy setting. 
Conversely, the approach of evaluating labour market policies with 
agent-based models still entails some issues: the model specification is a key 
factor that can involve difficulties and the calibration is still imperfect. 
ABMs may actually be hostile to policy makers, as they might confront them 
with the fact that for many of their objectives, they have limited control 
options, as it takes technical expertise to run and interpret them. 
This thesis proposes a methodology, Agent-based Computational 
Economics (ACE), aimed to identify and quantify the effects of different 
situations and hypotheses together: the procedure presented in this 
dissertation should be considered as a starting point for further 
improvements. 
